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                                                            I. Introduction 
I. A. Research Problem  
One of the most controversial issues in Korean agricultural policies during the Park 
Chung Hee regime was Saemaul Undong. These controversies have been attracting 
scholars to scrutinize Saemaul Undong from many perspectives. Their work has 
centered around Saemaul Undong’s ideology, its implementation, and its consequences. 
Many scholars elaborate their arguments on those issues in their studies. To a certain 
extent, it seems that the scholars are divided into two groups.  The first group of 
scholars consists of scholars who argues that Saemaul Undong enlightened the rural 
community through socializing self-reliance, cooperation, and diligent spirits (Kim, ed. 
1977: 207-235; Choe, 1978). In implementing Saemaul Undong, the Korean 
government employed a mechanism that empowered rural people by providing wide 
room for them to participate voluntarily in any projects under the banner of Saemaul 
Undong (Saemaul Undong Center Training Institution, 2000: 11-44; ibid: 45-59; 
Whang, 1997: 151-183). As a result of the spiritual enlightenment as well as 
empowerment, Saemaul Undong increased farmer’s income and living standards (Park, 
1998; Whang, 1981). Meanwhile the second group of scholars argues the opposite. 
According to the second group, Saemaul Undong was a manifestation of political 
maneuver in response to declining political support from rural people to the incumbent 
(Lie, 1998: 109-111, Burmeister, 1988). The incumbent mobilized his officials as well 
as rural communities through authoritarian method and coercive pressure (Ban, Moon, 
and Perkins, 1980: 200-280). Under this mechanism, Saemaul Undong generated a 
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situation in which rural people became wary to be involved in government program, 
creating a lack of participation, even resentment and cynicism (Hopkins, Puchala, and 
Talbot, ed., 1979: 133-169; Wade, 1982).       
The debate above is important. It could be discerned from two points of view. 
First is substantial point of view. Substantially, the debate maps about the Korean 
agricultural politics. It helps to understand social-economic as well as political aspects 
of Saemaul Undong. Hence, for one who intend to study about Korean agricultural 
politics, understanding the debate is an alternative gate. 
Second is political lens. The debate involves a formal institution. The institution 
is Saemaul Undong Cntral Training Institute. It was established in 1972 aimed to train 
Saemaul Undong leaders (Lee and Kim, 1991: 413-414). Currently, its role is 
disseminating Saemaul Undong ideology. It is conducted through providing scholarship 
for public policy decision maker from around the world to attend training on Saemaul 
ideology and its success story. This fact implies that politically the first group is more 
powerful than the second group of scholars.  Regardless of the accuracy of these two 
group’s arguments, in terms of Saemaul Undong’s efficacies increase in income per 
household; support to achieve rice self sufficiency; restrained migration flow from rural 
to urban areas, Saemaul Undong is interesting to be scrutinized. In terms of enhancing 
rural community income, the contribution of Saemaul Undong is important to be 
investigated because in 1969, two years before the initiation of Saemaul Undong, the 
Korean government initiated dual price policy (Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, 1999: 48) with the same objective as that of Saemaul Undong, 
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namely to enhance farmer income (Hopkins, Puchala, and Talbot, ed., 1979: 159). 
Hence, it was possible that the enhancement of farmer income was not a result of 
Saemaul Undong but due to dual price policy. Impacts of Saemaul Undong in achieving 
rice self-sufficiency is also interesting because during the implementation of Saemaul 
Undong Korea was not able to attain rice self-sufficiency. Korea achieved rice self-
sufficiency in 1990s (see table 4.B.1) in the period when Saemaul Undong was no 
longer implemented. During the implementation of Saemaul Undong, Korea not only 
less successful to achieve rice self-sufficiency but also less successful to restrain 
migration flow from rural to urban areas. There was no different trend of migration 
between the period before the launch of Saemaul Undong and after its implementation. 
Kim and Son (Lindauer, and others, 1997: 127) have found that in the period of 1965-
1970 and 1970-1980 there was a similar migration trend: urban population growth 
through migration from rural areas. 
Those puzzles above in fact were the main features of Saemaul Undong and 
were a part of its objectives. Achieving rice self-sufficiency has been the dominant 
objective of Korean agricultural policies (Cha and others, ed., 1997: 477; OECD, 1999: 
43). Attaining rice self sufficiency was not only the most important objective of Korean 
agricultural policies but also one of the goals of Saemaul Undong (Wade, 1982: 18) in 
addition to increasing farmers’ income (Hasan, 1976: 159; Kim, ed., 1977: 208) and 
restraining migration flow to urban area (Ban, Moon, and Perkins, 1980: 275; Hopkins, 
Puchala, and Talbot, ed. 1979: 153; Wade, 1982: 18).  
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Increasing farmer income in the period of the initiation of Saemaul Undong was 
a crucial demand because there was a wide inequality of income between rural 
community and urban people (Lindauer, and others, 1997: 131). This income disparity 
occurred because Park Chung Hee emphasized building the Korean economy through 
industrial development in urban areas. Through chaebol companies, the Korean 
government tried to develop Korean economy by focusing on export (Lie, 1998: 75). 
Many scholars argued that from the late 1960s until the 1970s, the industrial sector 
achieved high performance growth. According to Krueger (Cha, Kim, and Perkins, 
1997:313), from 1964 to 1973 Korean Growth Domestic Product (GDP) grew at annual 
rate of 10.5%.  This achievement was not separate from the efficacy of export 
performance, which grew annually almost 40%. 
The successful industrial development, unfortunately, was not accompanied by 
the high performance of agricultural sector. Agriculture has lagged behind compared to 
the industrial sector (Kim, ed. 1977: 206; Ghai, and others, ed. 1979: 32), and the 
performance of agriculture actually declined (Saemaul Undong Central Training 
Institute, 2000: 64; Lee and Kim, 1991: 371). That was why the disparity of income 
distribution between urban and rural areas was getting worse in the late of 1960s. In that 
period urban people could enhance their income due to the growth of industrial output 
while the farmer who lived in rural areas could not increase his income because the 
stagnation of agricultural productivity. The determinant of low agricultural 
performance was not only the policy of “growth first distribution later” implemented by 
the Korean government but also the lack of government attention to the agricultural 
sector (Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute, 2000: 63; Cha, and others, 1997: 
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469). However to enhance farmers’ income as well as to subsidize urban people, the 
Park regime paid more attention to agricultural development through initiating dual 
price policy in 1969 (Lee and Kim, 1991: 380). This attention became more salient later 
though initiating Saemaul Undong in 1971. Meanwhile, self-sufficiency in rice has 
been a crucial necessity since 1960s (Cha, and others, 1997: 473). Adequate supply of 
rice became a first priority in Korean agricultural policies because of national security 
(Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute, 2000: 94; Anderson, 1987: 14). Hence, the 
Korean government undertook  a range of efforts through many policies to attain rice 
self-sufficiency. Unfortunately those efforts took a long period. Korea required more or 
less than 30 years to attain rice self-sufficiency.  Korea, eventually, achieve rice self-
sufficiency in 1990s, in the period in which Saemaul Undong was not implemented 
anymore.  In case of migration flow to urban area, migration had numerical as well 
as social-economic impact during 1920s. After the Korean War migration showed a 
dynamic trend. From 1955 to1967, there was low rate of migration to urban area so that 
the population of farmers increased steadily. However, from 1967 to 1975 the migration 
rate increased, with the result that the number of rural people who engaged in the 
agricultural sector significantly decreased (Sung, Pal, and Perkins, ed., 1980: 319-321). 
Taking account of this migration trend, the Korean government initiated Saemaul 
Undong.  
Declining farmer population trends of did not end at that period. From 1970-
1996, the Korean population expanded rapidly from 32 million to 45 million but on the 
contrary, the farmer population declined. In 1965 the number of farmers was 15.8 
million; in 1970 farmer population was 14.4 million; and in 1990 declined to 6.7 million 
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(Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute, 2000: 72). From this trend one could 
understand the desire of Saemaul Undong to restrain migration flow to urban areas.
 However, President Park Chung Hee claimed that Saemaul Undong made a 
significant contribution to rural community development (Hopkins, Puchala, and Talbot, 
ed., 1979: 153). In his message at National conference of Saemaul Leaders he stated:  
“All these outstanding results are a crystallization of the sweat and labor of all 
Saemaul leaders and the rural population who have worked in unity and were 
inspired by the Saemaul spirit of diligence, self-help, and teamwork. In my view, 
the Saemaul movement (Saemaul Undong)… is the driving force behind the 
conquest of difficulties and the creation of the new chapter of national history” 
(Message at National conference of Saemaul Leaders, December 18, 1974, 
noted by Whang, 1981: 45). 
 
The claim above is the other puzzle aside from any other puzzles mentioned 
before. What Park Chung Hee claimed seem did not reflect the facts. It was possible 
that the claim had a political motive. Many authors such as Brand (Sung, Pal, and 
Perkins, ed., 1980: 275), Kihl (Hopkins, Puchala, and Talbot, ed., 1979: 156), 
Burmeister (1988: 70) and Wade (1982: 18) believe that the initiation of Saemaul 
Undong was not separate from political reasons. According to Wade (1982: 18), Park 
Chung Hee launched Saemaul Undong as a response to losing crucial rural political 
support in the presidential election. Moreover, John Lie (1998: 54) argued that to 
maintain the status quo, the Park regime depended on rural political support. 
Park not only claimed that the implementation of Saemaul Undong was 
successful but also propagandized Saemaul Undong (Sung, Pal, and Perkins, ed., 1980.: 
275). The propaganda of Saemaul Undong was conducted through many media. Every 
morning Korean people, could hear Saemaul Undong songs on the radio. According to 
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Moon and Sul (Cha, and others, ed 1997; 495) one could see the Saemaul Undong flag 
flying beside the national flag. Saemaul Undong slogans were painted on every public 
building throughout Korea. On television Korean people could watch the successful 
story of Saemaul Undong. 
However Brandt’s observation suggests that those claims as well as propaganda 
were not supported by valid data. Reports on the outcome of Saemaul Undong project 
that came to central government were not based on real facts. According to Brandt 
(Sung, Pal, and Perkins, ed, 1980: 276) local governments tended to falsify their reports. 
That was because individual promotion of government officials was judged on 
performance in accomplishing Saemaul Undong project goals imposed by higher 
agencies. Therefore, in order to reach the target, local government marked-up the 
outcome of project to paint a false picture of their successful accomplishment.  
 The facts discussed above expresses the debate among the two groups of 
scholars. The debate is still going on to maintain each of its arguments. To contribute 
new discourse on Saemaul Undong, it is crucial to investigate the issues elaborated 
above.  
I. B. Objective of The Research 
 This aim of this research is to scrutinize the Korean agricultural politics during 
the Park regime. This research would focus on economic and political aspects of 
Saemaul Undong. At economic aspect, this research would analyze effects of Saemaul 
Undong in enhancing rural people income, achieving rice self-sufficiency, and 
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restraining migration flow to urban to urban area. At political respects, it would 
investigate about political motive behind the initiation of Saemaul Undong. 
In more detail, this research would find out the answer of puzzles elaborated 
above. These puzzles could be expressed into four-research questions: did Saemaul 
Undong increase rural community income? The second research question is: was 
Saemaul Undong enable Korea to achieve rice self-sufficiency? The third one is:  did 
Saemaul Undong restrain migration flow to urban area? The last research question is: 
What was the political motive of Park Chung Hee initiated Saemaul Undong? 
 
I.C. Theoretical Framework 
 Saemaul Undong was multifaceted phenomenon. It could be approached from 
many perspectives. In this research Saemaul Undong is viewed as strategy as well as a 
policy. What is meant by strategy is Saemaul Undong is assumed as mechanism to 
develop rural community. Meanwhile Saemaul Undong as a policy, Saemaul Undong is 
discerned as a product of power holder’s decision to respond a certain situation during 
she/he takes authority. This part would elaborate those two approaches.  
 
I.C.1 Saemaul Undong: A Strategy of Rural Community Development 
 Many scholars agree that Saemaul Undong was a strategy of rural development. 
Kim and Son (Lindauer, 1997: 140-141) elaborated that Saemaul Undong as well as 
dual price policy were strategies of rural development. The reason of this argument is 
because those two projects aimed to reduce income inequality, increased living 
 9
condition, and build infrastructure. Similarly, Park (1998: 2-3) argued that Saemaul 
Undong was an integrated rural development. That was because the purpose of Saemaul 
Undong was to modernize traditional rural sector. It was implemented through building 
physical infrastructure. 
In line with those two authors, Whang (1981: 5-6) argued that Saemaul Undong 
was Korean model rural development. Concept of Korean model of rural development 
refers to a strategy, which was developed in a specific case. In this sense the case was 
Korean case. The model was not relied on an academic research or theoretical reference 
but it was an experimental strategy. Korean government implemented Saemaul Undong 
through trial and error method. 
In this elaboration, Saemaul Undong would be discerned from three theoretical 
approaches: empowerment, modernization, and income generation approaches. Those 
three approaches are based on the main features of Saemaul Undong.  
Term trial and error mentioned above refers a method without involving a 
certain planning format. This model was totally different from some rural community 
development ideas. According to Cernea (1985:15-21), rural development should cover 
essential stages. The stage consists of project identification, project preparation, project 
appraisal, project implementation, and project evaluation.  
Project identification is a step that refers to an effort to asses potential of 
particular development intervention. In this stage, collecting social data to estimate the 
consequence of the project is important. At second stage: project preparation, concept of 
development potential is transformed into planned sequences of implementation. To do 
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so, it requires selected data and capability to respond unexpected change and to design 
alternative strategy particularly for participation. Third stage is to review any project 
under the preparation stage. The next stage: project implementation and monitoring 
stage, translating the entire projects undertaken in previous stages. It is necessary to 
highlight that; the implementation of the entire stages is flexible. It should not exactly 
as planned to respond any social changes. 
In line with Cernea, International Labor Organization (1999) in its elaboration 
on community based training divide this project into three steps: pre training step, 
delivery step, and post training steps. Those stages consist of any effort to attract 
participation from local people in the process of decision-making, gathering information, 
implementation the project, monitoring, and evaluation. International Labor 
Organization beliefs that through this model, training project would match with local 
people need; utilized local resources optimally; and empower local people. 
 The main idea of those efforts is how to put people in the center of development. 
This concept suggests method to treat people as subject of development. Many 
experiences depict that projects were conducted from central level without involving 
local people at any step of the project. Uphoff (Cernea, 1991: 467-511), in his study 
about the role of participation in community development project, analyzed 3 projects 
of integrated rural development in Nepal, Ghana, and Mexico. Uphoff argued that even 
though those three projects were innovatively designed, the projects were implemented 
in centralized mechanism and non-participatory planning. Under this approach, those 
projects were not fit to people. People were less beneficial from these projects. Uphoff, 
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then, argued that ideally the projects should provide wider room for local people to 
participate. Participation, in this case, should be involved in the process of decision-
making, gathering information, implementation of project, monitoring, and evaluation. 
The arguments elaborated above are related to the first approach of community 
development; empowerment approach. This approach beliefs that the core concept of 
community development is empowerment. According to Zimmerman concept of 
empowerment is: 
 “Empowerment processes are one in which attempts to gain control, obtain 
needed resources, and critically understand one’s social environment are 
fundamental. The process is empowering if it helps people develop skill so they 
become independent problem solver and decision makers” (Fatterman, et. all., 
1996: 4).  
In this concept, local people have a wide access to participate at every step of 
development. 
To empower people, it could be conducted in many mechanisms. One of method 
to empower local people is through providing training for local people. In this sense 
training is viewed as a method to enable local people to conduct every step of 
community development. Through attending training local people would be more self-
reliant. It prepares local people as decision maker as well as actor of community 
development. Therefore local people would be able to manage their local resources 
without depending up on other entities. 
At second approach: modernization, rural development is discerned as process 
of modernization. Rural development, according to Szirmai (1997: 281) is assumed as a 
process of transformation from traditional to modern community. This process is caused 
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by economic and technological development. In this sense, the driving forces of 
modernization are development of technology, commercialization of agriculture, 
increasing of agriculture wage as well as cash crop and urbanization. 
Similarly, Weaver, Rock, and Kustener (1997: 152) argued that rural 
modernization is a change from traditional to modern. In this respect, modernization 
theory assumed that there are two categories of community: traditional and modern. 
Process of transforming into modern society occurs through diffusion of capital, 
technology, values, and institution arrangement.  
Regardless those determinants, rural community would change by itself. Society 
is dynamic. Since rural community need urban product such as clothes, agricultural 
input of production, and some other needs, they migrate to urban. This movement 
enables to reduce degree of isolation and eventually transform rural community. 
However the direction, speed, and intensity of change would be different from 
modernization. In this sense, government plays a key role to manage the change so that 
the change is modernizing rural people. 
According to Kim (1996: 56), modernization is an acculturation process. The 
surge of modernization would be adopted by society and then come to process of 
indigenous adaptive change. Moreover Kim (1996: 58-59) divided the process of 
modernization into five stages. First stage is cultural preparedness:  refers to capability 
of a society to prepare for adopting the acculturation. Second is cultural selectivity: is 
selective response of society to surge of modernization. In this selection a society 
should be flexible to minimize social contraction. This flexibility is the third stage. It is 
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called cultural flexibility. Fourth is structural flexibility: is a stage reveals how a certain 
social structure determine the process of adjustment. The more rigid the structure of 
society, the more difficult to adjust with the change. The last step is political selectivity: 
implies selection process conducted by political authority. In this step, role of 
government to decide: where, when, and how to conduct the modernization is important. 
The last approach is income generation. Many scholars such as Adelman and 
Robinson (1978: 146) and Szirmai (1997: 277) agree that one facet of rural community 
development is how to increase rural people income. They argued that rural 
development is designed to increase rural income through raising agricultural 
production as well as generate non-agricultural sources of income, such as trade, home 
industry, and services. 
To increase agricultural production government build infrastructure to facilitate 
process of production. It may be in the form of irrigation system and other physical 
infrastructure. Not only does by building infrastructures but also by undertaking 
agricultural research and distribute agricultural input equally. Financing agricultural 
research is important to find a high-yield variety. At the same time, distribution of 
pesticide, fertilizer, and another input equally is to convince that every farmer has the 
similar access to gain agricultural input. 
Those efforts, however, in many cases enable to increase income inequality 
between small farmer and large farmer (Szirmai,1997: 267) That is because large 
farmer has a higher access to gain the input. Since the price of new variety of seed and 
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other input is relatively high so only large farmer that has a high access to purchase the 
agricultural input. 
The second problem that may occur is that the rural development is more 
benefited to investor of agricultural input industry rather than to farmer. Since 
distribution of high yield variety, fertilizer, and pesticide may involve private sector, it 
is possible that the system is more beneficial to the market. In this respect, role of 
government to control the distribution is important. 
The third problem is rural development could not raise purchasing power of 
rural people. It is possible that rural development upgrades the nominal farmer income. 
However it does not increase purchasing power. It happens because the management of 
price between price received by farmer and price paid by farmer is not on the side of 
farmer. To fulfill daily need and to get agricultural input farmer has to purchase them in 
urban area. If the outcome of selling agricultural product could not meet price of urban 
goods as well as urban services, it is meant that rural development could not enhance 
purchasing power of farmer.  Therefore, definition of income is important. Concept of 
income, in this research is a term that refers to purchasing power of farmer. Taking 
account of this fact, it is need to emphasize that rural development should be more on 
the side of small farmer rather than large farmer, market investor, and urban people. 
The above problem in fact occurred in many developing countries. In more 
detail Lipton stated that: 
“It is above of all by cheapening farm outputs that both private and public power 
transfer saving capacity from agriculture to the rest of economy…… The 
balance of private power would suffice to tilt the ‘price fixing balance’ in favor 
of modern urban industry: one or a few big supplier of fertilizer….., able to to 
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influence total ability and (via advertising) demand for their product, are able to 
affect its price, as thousand of isolated and competing farmers are not. Moreover, 
the industrializing preferences of historically ‘developing’ governments have 
often led them to transfer resources out of agriculture by cheapening food” 
(Lipton, 1989: 293). 
 
Adelman and Robinson (86-89) elaborate their opinion on the above problem. 
According to them, agricultural terms of trade is a concept that revels whether 
agricultural sector is benefited or not to other sector. Agricultural terms of trade is a 
result of ratio between price received by farmer and price paid by farmer. The higher 
rate of the term of trade the more beneficial the economic system to farmer. It generates 
farmer purchasing power. On the other hand, if terms of trade is low, rural development 
engender trickle up effects because agricultural income is transferred to urban. To 
increase terms of trade, upgrading agricultural production is not the single method to 
rely on. High production without good management of supply of the production would 
deteriorate terms of trade. Through high supply it may worsen off to terms of trade. 
Effort to increase agricultural production should be implemented after terms of trade 
has already grown up. Determinants that stipulate terms of trade are demand of 
agricultural production from urban and supply of urban goods and services.  Therefore, 
role of government to manage those determinant plays an important role. In this respect, 
relationship between rural and urban is the key point of rural development. Rural should 
not be treated as a separated entity to urban area. They should be as  one economic 
system. 
 
I.C.2 Saemaul Undong: A Policy of Rural Community Development 
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 Saemaul Undong as a policy could be viewed from many indicators (see Burden, 
1998: 1). First, it was a product of legalized decision making. Park as reelected 
president in 1963 and 1967  was the legalized power holder who initiated Saemaul 
Undong. Second, Saemaul Undong refers to a state intervention to respond a certain 
problematic issue. Third, it involved mobilization of government official. Park 
governed Saemaul Undong through employing Ministry of Home Affairs.  
 As a political decision making product, policy involves political interest. 
Political actors make their decision relying on their political interest. According to 
Milner (1997: 35) actor’s fundamental interests determine their policy preference. 
Actors are viewed has certain basic interest. They try to maximize their interest. 
Therefore if political actor issued a certain policy, this policy may be used as their 
instrument to realize their interests. This political interest may in the form of 
maximizing income or maintaining political position. 
 To retain political position, reelection is the legalized political mechanism to 
realize this goal. In this sense Milner (1997: 34-35) argued that politicians attempt to 
get authority through election. In many case political actors choose a policy in 
accordance with their party platform or campaign promises. However, to win the 
election, political actors may decide to serve their constituents interests. In other words, 
consideration on electoral interest may determine policy that implemented by political 
actors. 
Similarly, Lipset (1981: 313-318) elaborated that political party supporter 
determine party policy. The continuity of ruling power is determined by election. The 
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ruling power could extend its period of taking authority if its constituents support it . To 
attract supporters’ vote, politicians serve them through policy they are interested in. It is 
meant that there is a political exchange between politicians and their supporters. 
Politicians issued a policy in accordance with supporter need. At the same time, the 
constituents give their legitimacy the politicians to take the authority. 
Concept of legitimacy is the political element that is required by power holders. 
Most of power holders claim that they are the legitimated power to govern. According 
to Lipset (1981: 64) legitimacy refers to capacity of political system to create and 
maintain the willingness of populist to admit that the existing political institutions are 
the right institutions to govern. Without legitimacy, power holder governs their people 
without gaining voluntary compliance. 
Subordinate would obey voluntarily to legitimized order. On the other side 
illegitimate powers have to mobilize its power to gain obedience. In this sense, it is 
possible the incumbent exercise its power by pressures. Subordinate may not obey to 
the order. Populist assume that illegitimate power as a coercive (Coser and 
Rosenberg,1969: 145). Related to this respect Weber argue that: 
“…..every such system attempt to establish and cultivate the beliefs in its 
legitimacy. But according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of 
obedience, kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode 
of exercising the authority, will differ fundamentally.” (Weber, 1968: 213) 
 
To gain compliance, according to Goldheimer and Shils (Coser and rosenberg, 
1969: 145),  power holder may exercise his/her force to influence subordinate behavior 
either in explicit or implicit method. Explicit mechanisms are manifested in command 
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and request. Meanwhile implicit methods, or Goldheimer and Shils call it as 
manipulation employ symbols to influence subordinate. The major form of 
manipulative symbol is propaganda. 
 
I. D. Overview of Previous Studies on Saemaul Undong  
 In fact there have been many studies that have been undertaken in Korea to 
understand Saemaul Undong.  However, there is still a limited amount of research 
which focuses on an inquiry to find out whether Saemaul Undong increased rural 
community income per house hold, enabled Korea to attain rice self-sufficiency, 
restrained migration flow to urban area, and revealed the political motive behind the 
initiation of Saemaul Undong. 
 A study undertaken by Park.(1998) focused on the contribution of Saemaul 
Undong to rural modernization. As an integrated rural development project, Saemaul 
Undong improved the condition of rural villages, raised the living standard of rural 
communities; and increased agricultural output. Park argues that in the implementation 
of Saemaul Undong, the Korean government conducted this policy through involving 
healthy cooperation among ministries. The author also tries to provide formulae for 
developing countries to imitate Saemaul Undong in their process of rural transformation 
from traditional rural to modern rural. In another study about Saemaul Undong, 
Park (Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute, 2000: 9-44) elaborates Saemaul 
Undong less broadly than in his previous study. In this study Park focuses on the history 
of Saemaul Undong. In his historical elaboration, Park emphasized that the successes of 
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Saemaul Undong in improving living conditions and modernizing the traditional village 
as a result of the government’s implementation of Saemaul Undong through democratic 
mechanisms and its stimulation of participation of rural people. Employing data 
published by the Ministry of Home Affair/Saemaul Undong, Park elaborates the project 
undertaken through Saemaul Undong and the budget spent by government to implement 
many projects.   
From the same perspective with Park, Yu (Saemaul Undong Central Training 
Institute, 2000: 45-59) explains that Saemaul Undong as a strategy of rural community 
and regional development. The implementation of Saemaul Undong was facilitated 
through guidance work which had two functions, namely agriculture extension service 
and community development. This guidance was an effective instrument to help rural 
people select a project, mobilize resources to improve their physical as well as social 
environment, and increase income per household. Yu also emphasizes that the success 
of Saemaul Undong was not separate from the conducive atmosphere built by 
government that encouraged voluntary participation of rural community.  
In line with Yu, Whang (1981) tries to elaborate the mechanism of governing 
Saemaul Undong, the performance of Saemaul Undong, and the determinant of the high 
performance of Saemaul Undong. According to Whang, Saemaul Undong was 
conducted through close cooperation between one government agencies and others that 
take responsibility for Saemaul Undong as well as integration between those agencies 
and rural people. As a Korean model of rural development, Saemaul Undong achieved 
high performance in mobilizing investment and manpower. The impact of this 
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performance was that Saemaul Undong improved the motivation of farmers, fostered 
village leadership as well as farmer participation, and increased farmer income per 
household. Those mentioned above were the impacts at the level of village. At the 
national level, the enhancement of farmer income contributed to a decrease the income 
inequality between rural and urban area. These achievements were due to the well-
organized strategy in implementing Saemaul Undong, the dynamics of political and 
government system; and social transformation in the rural community. A part of 
another study about the transformation of Korea’s economy 1945-1995, Wang (1997: 
151-183) argues that Saemaul Undong was a Korean version of integrated rural 
development. This integrated rural development strategy resulted in remarkable changes. 
Those changes consisted of the improvement of participatory organization; fostering of 
development values as well as attitudes of farmers, and improvement of rural 
infrastructure. The success of rural development was not apart from the commitment of 
the political leadership of president Park to develop rural areas and reorientation the 
government system toward rural development. 
Ban (Kim ed, 1977; 207-2350) argues that Saemaul Undong was initiated as 
comprehensive rural development to increase farmer income and improve their living 
conditions. To achieve these objectives the implementation of Saemaul Undong was 
divided into three inter-connected aspects, namely spiritual enlightenment, 
improvement of investment, and increasing income. Spiritual enlightenment was an 
aspect that emphasized on how to socialize ideal attitudes so that the farmer has the 
awareness to be more self-reliant and cooperative. Improvement of investment was an 
effort to improve sanitation in order to enhance living conditions. Meanwhile, 
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increasing income, according to Sung was an effort to raise farmer income through 
enhancing rice production. The measure of the Saemaul Undong performance was its 
magnitude of physical investment and degree of participation. 
Similarly, Choe (1978) explains that the objectives of Saemaul Undong were to 
socialize spiritual enlightenment among rural people, improve living environments and 
increase rural community income. In doing so, the Korean government implemented 
Saemaul Undong into three stages, namely the preliminary stage, the popular stage, and 
the stable stage. The preliminary stage was an initiation and implementation stage to 
build the foundation of Saemaul Undong and improve the environment. The popular 
stage was a stage that tried to mobilize rural participation, provide training, and increase 
farmer income. Meanwhile the stable stage was an institutional stage consisting of inter-
village projects, regional projects, and reorganization of village structure. Those stages 
relied on three philosophical efforts, namely socialization of farmer willingness to 
improve living environment, raise self-confidence; and cultivation of diligence, self-
help as well as cooperation. In this case the government played a key role. Government 
provided training for and leaders, provided financial and technical support and governed 
the village development.   
Meanwhile Moon (Lee and Kim, 1991: 405-427) argues that the basic ideology 
of Saemaul Undong was founded on rural enlightenment, social development, and 
economic development. The mechanism to realize this basic ideology was through 
encouraging the participation of rural people. They not only did so by encouraging 
participation, but the government implemented Saemaul Undong also by providing 
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training and education to foster village leadership. The success of Saemaul Undong was 
not separate from the coordination between the central government and local 
governments as well as between one ministry and another. The other factor that caused 
the success of Saemaul Undong was government support in the form of financial 
support. The impacts of Saemaul Undong were improvement of living environment, 
increasing of income, and enhancement of saving rate in rural area. In the last part of 
Moon’s study, he criticizes Saemaul Undong. According to Moon, Saemaul Undong 
was implemented as a top down mechanism, in an authoritarian way, with a coercive, 
and hierarchical structure.  
In contrast with studies elaborated above, Lie (1998: 109-111) in a part of his 
explanation regarding the political economy of South Korea argues that Saemaul 
Undong was initiated as a respond to a decrease of political support in rural areas for 
president Park. Saemaul Undong was implemented in an authoritarian and coercive way. 
In addition, Saemaul Undong was implemented as a top down mechanism. Any 
decisions related to Saemaul Undong were made from the Blue House without 
involving local governments as well as without involving grassroots. 
In line with Lie, Kihl, (Hopkins, Puchala, and Talbot ed., 1979: 133-169) argues 
that Saemaul Undong was launched as a political mobilization that caused 
modernization of rural areas. This mobilization had three objectives. Those objectives 
are spiritual enlightenment, environmental improvement, and enhancement of farmer 
income. Saemaul Undong, however was not discrete from the political situation in the 
period of its initiation. In the early 1970s political support of rural communities for Park 
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was decline. To maintain this political support Park Chung Hee paid more attention to 
rural development through the inauguration of Saemaul Undong. Unfortunately 
Saemaul Undong was implemented in an authoritarian way and as a top down 
mechanism. To govern in that way the government employed the Ministry of Home 
Affair, not the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, to control over the entire 
implementation of Saemaul Undong. This mechanism did not encourage participation 
of grassroots and even produced resentment and cynicism. That was why the 
government conducted mass campaigns of indoctrination.   
Similarly, Brandt (Ban, Moon, and Perkins 1980: 260-280) argues that the 
initiation of Saemaul Undong was not discrete from political interest. To implement 
Saemaul Undong the government mobilized all government personnel and tended to 
blur the functional role of the government and create overlap among the agencies. The 
government emphasized successful accomplishment in a coercive way, which yielded 
pressure to local governments. This mechanism caused local governments to provide 
false reports to the central government in order to could meet the targets in the report. 
Many projects conducted in rural areas were not appropriate to local people’s need 
caused lack of their participation. The other aspect of Saemaul Undong implementation 
that is criticized by Brandt was Korean hierarchical structure. Brandt argued that 
Saemaul Undong was implemented in a hierarchical structure which caused difficulty in 
horizontal coordination among bureaus and among ministries.  
Burmeister, (1988) in his study regarding the Korean state and the green 
revolution elaborates that Saemaul Undong was a tremendous political maneuver to 
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maintain the incumbent’s status quo through improving infrastructure as well as farmer 
living standards. In other words, the Korean Government implemented Saemaul 
Undong to get wider political support. Through Saemaul Undong the government 
created a competition among villages and dependency of villages on the central 
government. This dependency was an instrument of the government to control over  the 
entire rural area. 
Wade (1982) explains that Saemaul Undong was one of four strategies to 
increase income and achieve rice self-sufficiency.  Through Saemaul Undong the 
government mobilized rural communities to build physical infrastructure and the 
government ideology of development. Therefore rural communities would be 
responsive to government guidance and loyal to the government. In implementing 
Saemaul Undong, the government divided village into three classifications, namely 
under-developed village, self-helping village, and independent village. The Korean 
government, afterwards, encouraged those villages to compete with one an other. This 
competition was a political means for the Korean government to get mass compliance 
on a wide spectrum of respects. In order to achieve high performance, government 
mobilized village pressure as a coercive mechanism. The Government determined the 
variety of paddies as well as imposed targets. If the farmer did not plant the 
recommended variety, the government destroyed seedbeds. That was why farmers were 
wary to be involved and tended to resist adoption of any government program. The 
mechanism of governing Saemaul Undong in the agricultural sector was implemented 
in the same way as that of the implementation of industrial Saemaul Undong. 
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 I.E. Limitations of Topic  
This research is mainly an inquiry into Korean agricultural politics during the 
period when president Park held authority in Korea. The inquiry will focus on social-
economic changes at rural and national levels caused by Saemaul Undong. At the rural 
level this research will highlight farmer income change. At the national level, it will 
emphasize the attainment of rice self-sufficiency, migration flow from rural to urban 
areas, and political motives behind the initiation of Saemaul Undong. Since this 
research deals with Saemaul Undong, it is necessary to limit which Saemaul Undong is 
investigated. This is because there were several types of Saemaul Undong. Choe 
(1978:3) argues that, originally, the Korean government initiated only a rural Saemaul 
Undong; however, in the process of development Saemaul Undong was expanded into 
various types of Saemaul Undong. In 1974 the Korean government initiated an urban 
Saemaul Undong. The Park regime in 1975, then implemented a factory Saemaul 
Undong, a school Saemaul Undong, and a church Saemaul Undong. In line with 
Choe, Moon and Sul (Cha, and others, ed., 1997: 495) states that Saemaul Undong 
began with undertaking projects of environmental improvement. The Korean 
government expanded scope of participation as well as activities of Saemaul Undong. In 
doing so, Saemaul Undong was expanded into factory Saemaul Undong, urban Saemaul 
Undong, and school Saemaul Undong. Since this research is committed to Korean 
agricultural politics to limit the analysis, this research would simply focus on rural 
Saemaul Undong. Moreover, technically, the Korean government employed the model 
of governing rural Saemaul Undong to conduct the other kinds of Saemaul Undong 
(Wade, 1982: 102). This means that to a certain extent, emphasizing the analysis of 
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rural Saemaul Undong would be also analyzing the other types of Saemaul Undong.
 The limitation elaborated above is the first limitation. The second limitation is 
related to agricultural products. Ministry of Agriculture and fisheries of the Republic of 
Korea (1981: 61-102) defines Korean agricultural products into three categories: grain, 
vegetable, and fruit. Each category consists of several kinds of product. It is difficult to 
deeply and fully scrutinize all of those products in this research.  Therefore, this 
research will simply focus on rice, a part of the grain category, as the main agricultural 
product of the elaboration.  The reason for limit the inquiry to rice is that rice has 
been the most important commodity in Korean agriculture (Song and Ryo, 1986: 6; 
Brown, 1973: 112). Rice has been dominant in terms of cultivated area, volume 
produced, and contribution to farmer income. Compared with other commodities, rice 
gets privileges. The Korean government has historically intervened to increase 
production of rice through many policies such as dual-price policy (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 1999: 47).   
In fact barley, wheat, and corn have been protected by the Korean government 
as almost highly as rice, however rice has been the most protected of the grain products. 
There are at least two reasons. The first reason is that rice’s contribution has been more 
than 80% of grain production in Korea as well as direct consumption. The second one is 
that consumer prices are not as distorted as other grain products (Anderson, 1978: 16). 
 
I.F. The Importance and Contribution of This Research   
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Among several studies elaborated in the overview of the previous studies on Saemaul 
Undong, none of them undertook a comparative analysis on pre-post implementation of 
Saemaul Undong in terms of increasing rural people’s income, achieving rice self-
sufficiency and restraining migration flows from rural to urban areas. Since this 
research would like to find the answer to these issues, this research is relatively new 
idea. 
This new idea is important to provide an alternative analysis in the discussion of 
Korean agricultural politics discourse particularly of the Saemaul Undong issue. Pre-
post comparative analysis of Saemaul Undong is one of the methods to find out whether 
there were any changes in the rural economy after the initiation of Saemaul Undong. In 
other words, methodologically, this analysis would prove whether Saemaul Undong 
made a significant contribution in those three respects mentioned above. If there were 
any significant changes, the analysis would lead to another inquiry as to how significant 
the contribution was. Meanwhile substantially, this analysis is also important because 
increasing income, attaining rice self-sufficiency, and restraining migration flows were 
the main major issues in Saemaul Undong as well as in Korean agricultural policies. 
Therefore if one wanted to study rural community development in Korea one basically 
should understand this issue.  
The comparative analysis of upgrading rural people’s income would not only 
disclose the phenomenon of the enhancement of farmer’s income but also the 
agricultural production rate. This argument relies on the fact that the Korean 
Government increased farmers’ income through enhancing agricultural production  
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(Lindauer, and others, ed. 1997; 143). This means that if rural community income per 
household increased, the production of agriculture should have increased as well. If the 
outcome of analysis shows another result, it is possible that another variable 
significantly influenced both of the variables.  
The above analysis would lead to inquiry of the impact of the agricultural 
production rate to the rice self-sufficiency and migration flow from rural to urban areas. 
In the case of attaining rice self-sufficiency, since Saemaul Undong tried to encourage 
the upgrading of agricultural production, the agricultural production would endow the 
achievement of rice self-sufficiency. Ideally, the implementation of Saemaul Undong 
caused the agricultural production increase and at the same time enabled Korea to 
achieve rice self-sufficiency. 
In terms of migration flow to urban areas, logically, Saemaul Undong should be 
able to restrain the migration. The upgrading of farmers’ income resulting from the 
enhancement of agricultural production should encourage people to live in rural areas. 
One of the main reasons people migrate to urban areas is to gain a higher income. The 
other point was because restraining people is exodus to urban areas was one of the 
major objectives of Saemaul Undong (Hopkins, Puchala, and Talbot ed., 1979: 153; 
Wade, 1982: 18) 
The explanation above shows that the three aspects, which would be analyzed in 
this research, had an inter-connected relationship. This phenomenon was interesting 
because the success of one aspect would cause the success of the others or the failure of 
one aspect would cause the other failures. Since these three aspects were important in 
 29
Sameaul Undong as well as in Korean agricultural policies, this inquiry would also be 
important to provide new alternative discussions. Moreover, this topic as well as the 
comparative analysis on pre post of the implementation of Saemaul Undong has never 
been undertaken. 
Interestingly, this research also unveil political motive embedded in the 
implementation of Saemaul Undong. In political discourse any policies issued by ruling 
power are discerned involving political interest. This analysis is important to understand 
political economy of the Korean agriculture. During the Park regime the performance of 
agricultural sector declined. It resulted wide gap between rural and urban people’s 
income. This circumstance eventually caused the political support of rural constituents 
to Park decline significantly. Therefore, scrutinizing whether park initiate Saemaul 
Undong was due to the decline support or because another factor is crucial study.                                      
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II. Method of Study 
 
This research is a combination of literature review, content analysis (see Denzin 
and Lincoln, ed., 1994: 464; Schutt, 1999; 356-357), and secondary data analysis (see 
Schutt, 1999; 403-406). The reason for employing more than one method is to obtain a 
holistic view of investigated phenomena. In this sense, it is possible to employ several 
methods either sequentially or simultaneously (Denzin and Lincoln, ed., 1994: 224).  
For a literature review the researcher would like to explore any previous studies 
related to Saemaul Undong, dual-price policies, and other studies focused on rural 
development and Korean agricultural politics. This part would discuss both left wing 
and right wing perspectives on the puzzles. To have deep insight for this analysis, the 
researcher would like to undertake secondary data analysis. Meanwhile content analysis 
would be used as an instrument to find out the political motives for the initiation of 
Saemaul Undong. The researcher, in this part, would scrutinize the speeches and other 
documents written by Park Chung Hee.  
In order to enhance the validity of data analysis, the researcher would like to 
undertake data triangulation (see Denzin and Lincoln, ed., 1994: 214). Secondary data 
that would be analyzed are statistical data that published by Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, and any other data compiled 
by previous researches on Saemaul Undong. The time period of analysis would cover 
from 1961 to 1981. The reason for this time period is because 1961 was the starting 
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period of Park regime and 1981 was the end period of conducting Saemaul Undong 
(Hopkins, Puchala, and Talbot ed., 1979: 162; Choe, 1978: 8).  
The problem with long time series data analysis is that sometimes one period 
and another period are difficult to compare or even incomparable. That is because one 
period and another period were published different books in a different format. Because 
of this problem, it would be possible that some analysis could not fully cover from 1961 
to 1981 period. 
The method of analysis of the secondary data would be a comparative study pre 
and post of the implementation of Saemaul Undong. In this case the comparative study 
would be divided into two parts, namely before the launch of Saemaul Undong, from 
1961 to1970 and after the launch of Saemaul Undong, 1971-1981. However since there 
were several steps in conducting Saemaul Undong, to have a detailed analysis, the 
period of the post implementation of Saemaul Undong period would be divided into the 
number of stages of the implementation of Saemaul Undong. 
According to Choe (1978: 9-16), Saemaul Undong consisted of three stages 
namely the preliminary stage, the popular stage, and the stable stage. The preliminary 
stage was conducted from 1971-1973 and was a combination of initiation and 
implementation steps to build the foundation of Saemaul Undong and improve the 
environment. The second stage, the popular stage that was conducted from 1974-1976, 
was a step that tried to mobilize rural participation, provide training, and increase 
income. Meanwhile the last stage, the stable stage, conducted from 1977-1981, was a 
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stage that implied any efforts to establish   inter-village projects, regional projects, and 
the reorganization of village structure. 
Taking account of the above facts, the time period of the comparative study 
would be divided into the period before the launch of Saemaul Undong 1961-1970, the 
first step of Saemaul Undong 1971-1973, the second step 1974-1974, and the third step 
1977-1981. This time period comparison is important to control the changes in of trends 
of increasing income. If the trend of upgrading income emerged saliently after the 
second stage that tried to increase income, it would imply that the enhancement of 
income due to Saemaul Undong. However if the trend of income enhancement show up 
before 1969 and the second stage, it would mean that without Saemaul Undong the 
income of farmer had already increased. In other words, the income of farmers 
increased not because of Saemaul Undong but due to dual-price policy. Since the 
phenomenon of income enhancement is inter-connected with phenomenon of rice self-
sufficiency, as well as migration flow to urban areas, as explained previously, the 
outcome of pre post analysis of income enhancement mentioned above would be used 
as a starting point to scrutinize rice self-sufficiency and migration flow phenomena. 
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III. Korean Agricultural Performance, Saumaul Undong, and Dual Price Policy  
 
III. A. Korean Agricultural Performance and Farmer’s Economy in 1961-1981 
 Period of 1961-1981 was a critical period in Korean agricultural development. 
This argument is relying on the importance of agricultural policies that were 
implemented in that period.  The other aspect is there was shift position of leading 
sector from agricultural sector to industrial sector. These two aspects were inter-
connected. Agricultural policies which were issued in that period were responding the 
shift of the leading sector position. Agricultural policies that were implemented were 
dual price policy, Saemaul Undong, and some other policies. Meanwhile the change 
position of leading sector was marked by the declining share of agricultural sector and 
upgrading share of non-agricultural sector into Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute, 2000: 101). This part would only discuss 
about the performance of agricultural sector. Meanwhile, dual price policy and Saemaul 
Undong would be elaborated in the next part. 
Shin (Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute, 2000: 62-64) argued that until 
1960s, Korea was agrarian country. During that period national output was dominated 
by agricultural sector. However, from the early of 1960s Korean agricultural 
performance declined continuously. As a result, industrial achievement outpaced that 
agriculture. That was due to development priority strategy implemented by Park regime 
emphasized on industrial development rather than agricultural sector development. 
Ban (Kim. ed., 1997: 206) explained that in the period 1960s-1970s the 
agricultural performance decreased. Compare with the other sectors, such as mining and 
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industrial sector, agricultural performance has lagged behind. In the period of 1962-
1971 agricultural performance grew up averagely at rate of 3.7 per year. Meanwhile 
mining and industrial grew up at rate of 17.9%. The low performance of agriculture was 
because of low productivity of labor.  
In line with those two authors, Lee (and others, ed. 1979: 32) stated that from 
1963-1975 share of agricultural sector in GDP dropped sharply. The determinants of the 
low performance in agriculture were declining population of farmer and low value 
added per worker. 
Table 3.A.1: Agriculture Share in Gross National Product  
Share of Agriculture in Gross National Product 
Year 
Current Prices  Constant 1970 Prices 
1956 46.0 42.1 
1957 44.2 42.5 
1958 40.2 43.1 
1959 33.6 40.9 
1960 35.9 39.9 
1961 39.5 42.5 
1962 35.6 38.6 
1963 41.2 38.3 
1964 44.5 40.7 
1965 36.7 37.6 
1966 33.8 37.1 
1967 29.5 32.4 
1968 26.6 29.2 
1969 27.0 28.7 
1970 26.2 26.2 
1971 27.0 24.5 
1972 26.5 22.8 
1973 23.5 20.1 
1974 23.4 19.2 
1975 24.0 19.2 
Source: BOK. National Income in Korea 1975 and Economic statistics Year Book 1976. cited by 
Ban, Moon and Perkins ( 1980: 14). 
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Table 3.A1 presented above expressing the same picture as elaborate by 3 
authors above. The table reveals the trend of major agricultural share in Gross National 
Product (GNP) from 1056-1975.  In general, either in current prices or constant prices 
shows the same tendency. At current prices, from 1956-1964 share of agriculture in 
GNP was fluctuating. Meanwhile at constant prices the fluctuated tendency emerged 
from 1956-1964 as well. After 1964 both prices depicts that share of agriculture 
declined continuously until 1975. 
At current prices, the highest sharing rate showed up in 1956 at rate of 46.0. The 
lowest rate, on the other hand, emerged in 1975. From these rates, the total declining 
rate was 22.0. Meanwhile at the constant prices, the highest rate was at rate of 43.1. It 
appeared in 1958 and the lowest rate emerged in 1974 as well as in 1975 at rate of 19.2. 
The declining rate was 23.9. 
Comparing agricultural performance in share in GDP with the performance of 
rice production shows a different picture. A difficulty of statistical data collection bring 
somewhat problem to compare them. From table 3.A.2, at the second column, it is clear 
that the comparable period is from 1961-1975. This column of the table presents that 
from 1964 –1975 rice production did not decline steadily. It was different from the 
share of agriculture in GDP. In that period agriculture share in GDP dropped down 
unwaveringly.  
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Table 3.A.2: Major Indicator of Farm Household Economy 
 
Year Rice Production Farmer Household 
Income 
Living 
Expenditure* 
Surplus of 
Income 
1962 3,014,915 67,885 57,719 10,166 
1963 3,758,047 93,179 82,111 11,068 
1964 3,954,491 125,692 107,751 17,941 
1965 3,501,132 112,201 107,439 4,762 
1966 3,919,280 130,176 117,105 13,071 
1967 3,603,104 149,470 135,311 14,159 
1968 3,195,335 178,959 150,960 27,999 
1969 4,090,444 217,874 180,532 37,342 
1970 3,939,260 255,804 218,024 37,780 
1971 3,997,635 356,382 255,233 101,149 
1972 3,957,190 429,394 326,193 103,201 
1973 4,211,630 480,711 357,567 123,144 
1974 4,444,858 674,451 455,380 219,071 
1975 4,669,098 872,933 646,002 226,931 
1976 5,214,963 1,156,254 788,369 376,885 
1977 6,005,610 1,432,809 1,031,983 400,826 
1978 5,797,128 1,884,194 1,399,493 484,701 
1979 5,564,808 2,227,483 1,776,501 450,982 
1980 3,550,257 2,693,110 2,288,012 405,098 
1981 5,062,975 3,687,856 2,885,030 802,826 
*Counted by summing up taxes and public charges, interest paid, living expenses, and other 
expenditures. 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Republic of Korea. Report on the Results of Farm 
Household Economy Survey 1972 and 1982, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Republic of 
Korea, Seoul. 
 
The entire picture of rice production from 1962-1972 shows the production of 
rice went up and down. From 1972-1977 the production increased unwaveringly from 
3,957,190 to 6,005,610. After that period, the production decreased continuously. 
From these fact, it is clear that rate of rice production was not the single 
determinant of agricultural share in GDP. This is right that high production of rice 
would lead to the high level of share in GDP. However, external factor also stipulated 
the level of agriculture share. In this case the external factor was the performance of 
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another sectors as well as their level share in GDP. For instance from 1972-1975 rice 
production grew up steadily but its share in GDP decreased steadily. This is meant that 
during that period, the performance of non-agricultural sector increased in rate more 
than that of agricultural sector. 
The declining share of agricultural sector in GDP was followed by the 
decreasing level of rural people income against that of urban people. Mostly, farmer 
income derived from agricultural output. On the other hand urban people income came 
from industrial sector. Declining performance of agriculture sector and increasing 
industrial output at the same time, automatically resulted shift trend of income of farmer 
and urban worker.  The higher the shift levels the higher the possibility to create income 
disparity. 
Song and Ryu (1986: 2) elaborated their argument that rapid growth of industry 
in urban area and declining agriculture performance were the factors of widening 
income inequality between rural and urban people. In the period of 1965-1973, because 
of those two factors, rural household income, compare with that of urban workers was 
only 60-90%. 
In accordance with Song’s and Ryu’s opinion, Ban (1975:1) argued that  there 
was a significant inequality of income between farm household and urban workers. This 
inequality appeared because economic development centered in industrial development 
in urban area. In 1969 average farm household income was 65% of urban people 
income. 
38 
Trend of income distribution is presented by table 3.A.3. The table shows 
income inequality in the late of 1960s, as agued by Song and Ryu as well as Ban. In the 
period of 1965-1982 the highest inequality rate in 1967. From 1965-1967 the inequality 
rose steadily. From 1968-1974 the disparity rate dropped down. Even in 1974, 1975, 
1977, and 1981 farmer income outpaced that of urban workers.  
Table3.A.3: Comparison of Rural Urban Household Income: 1965-1982 (in 1000 Won)  
 
Year 
A 
Farm Household 
Income 
B 
Urban Household 
Income 
A/B 
1965 112 113 99.1 
1966 130 162 80.2 
1967 149 249 59.8 
1968 179 286 62.6 
1969 217 334 65.0 
1970 256 381 67.2 
1971 356 452 78.8 
1972 429 517 83.0 
1973 481 550 87.5 
1974 674 645 104.5 
1975 873 859 101.6 
1976 1,156 1,158 99.8 
1977 1,433 1,405 102.0 
1978 1,884 1,916 98.3 
1979 2,227 2,630 84.7 
1980 2,693 3,205 84.0 
1981 3,688 3,450 106.9 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and fisheries Republic of Korea. Farm Household economic 
Survey, 1965-1982, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Republic of Korea, Seoul 
and Economic Planning Broad, Urban Household Expenditure Survey, 1965-1982 
Economic Planning Broad, Seoul cited by Moon (Lee and Kim, ed., 1991: 393). 
 
In fact in the entire period both farmer income and urban worker income rose 
unwaveringly. There was no one of the period shows the decline of income either in 
rural or urban households. However if the tendency is scrutinized, it is clear that from 
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1965-1967 urban sector grew up higher than rural sector. From 1965-1967 urban 
household incomes rose 136 while farm household only rose 37. In 1974, on the other 
hand rural community income increased higher than that of urban people. In 1974 rural 
household income increased 193 on the other hand urban workers simply rose 95. 
To understand the economy of farmer the analysis would go to the surplus of 
income. The surplus of income is resulted from farmer household income deducted by 
living expenditure. Taking account of that formula the analysis would include living 
expenditure of farmer. Since living expense is connected to urban price the analysis 
would also cover agricultural terms of trade. 
Table 3.A.2 depicts the amount of the surplus of income of farmer household. 
The farmer household income is consisted agricultural and side business income. Since 
the side business income was only 20% of the total household income (Adelman and 
Robinson, 1978:85) the analysis would focus simply on agricultural income. Living 
expenditure, on the other side, encompassed taxes and public charges, interest paid, 
living expenses, and other expenditures. The table shows that the highest achievement 
was the attainment in 1966. In 1965 the surplus of income was 4,762 and in 1966 the 
surplus of income was 13,071. Therefore in 1966 the surplus of income of farmer rose 
274%. However this enhancement emerged after the income decreased from 17,941 in 
1964 to 4,762 in 1965. It decreased 377%. Compare with the surplus of income in 1964, 
the surplus of income in 1966 was still lower than the surplus of income in 1964. 
Therefore the highest upgrading the surplus of income was the increasing from 1970-
1971, which attained 268%. 
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 Throughout the period, generally farmer household income increased. In 1965, 
however, the income decreased somewhat from 125,692 to 112, 201. After this period, 
the income grew up continuously until the end of the period. The highest rate of 
enhancement showed up in 1963 and 1981 in which the income rose almost 140%. 
The simple logical thought is that farmer household was resulted from rice 
production so the trend of rice production should be similar or almost similar with trend 
of farmer household income. If the rice production increases, the income of farmer 
should rise as well. The fact elaborated above shows different tendency. Rice 
production had waver trend. In contrast, farm household mostly shows a stable trend. 
From 1962-1972, in which the rice production went up and went down, in that period, 
except in 1965, income of farmer grew up steadily. Even when the rice production 
decline continuously from 1977-1980, farmer income rose unwaveringly. 
Since farmer household income has the same tendency as the surplus of income, 
the above interpretation could explain the surplus of income as well. In this sense, aside 
rice production, there must be another variables that caused the income of farmer grew 
up steadily. Those variable and its mechanism in influencing the surplus of income 
would be elaborate at next part.  
Trend of the farmer household income was followed by farmer living 
expenditure. When farmer household income grew up, living expenditure also grew up. 
When income dropped down, living expenditure declined as well. The decline of living 
expenditure in 1965, unfortunately was lower than that of farmer income. Farmer 
household income dropped down 11%, on the other hand living expenditure simply 
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decreased 3%. This resulted the surplus of income of farmer decreased higher than 
declining of farmer household income and living expenditure. The surplus of income 
declined 73%. 
This decline of income was the only one that declined as emerged in farmer 
household income as well as living expenditure. This minus growth also happened in 
the same year as farmer household income and living expenditure. In the other periods, 
from 1962-1981 the surplus of income of farmer grew up steadily.  
Since living expenditure of farmer is not discrete from price of urban products, 
such as clothes, fertilizer, pesticide, and some other needs, this analysis would involve 
agricultural terms of trade. Since the limitation of data about term of trade, data on that 
issue would be presented into two tables. 
Table 3.A.4 presented below, implies that from 1963-1968 the term of trade was 
dropped down continuously. After this period, terms of trade grew up unwaveringly 
until 1973 and eventually declined in the last period. The lowest rate of terms of trade 
was in 1968 at rate 94.3 and the highest was in 1973 at 11.7.  
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Table 3.A.4: The Term of Trade for Agricultural Products, 1963-1974 
 
Year 
A 
Price Received by 
Farmer (140 Item) 
B 
Price Paid by  
Farmer (49 Item) 
A/B  
1963 40.1 35.3 113.6 
1964 50.2 44.8 112.1 
1965 52.2 51.8 100.8 
1966 55.4 58.1 95.4 
1967 63.5 65.8 96.5 
1968 74.3 78.8 94.3 
1969 84.8 86.8 97.7 
1970 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1971 121.4 114.4 106.1 
1972 147.9 130.5 113.3 
1973 164.2 143.1 114.7 
1974 215.6 192.5 112.0 
Source: National Agricultural Cooperative Federation. Agricultural Cooperative Year Book 
1975, National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, Seoul. 
 
The tendency belongs to price received as well as price paid by farmer different 
from that of terms of trade. Both price received by farmer and price paid by farmer grew 
unwaveringly throughout the period. Agricultural terms of trade, on the other hand was 
fluctuate. This fact implies that when term of trade dropped down price paid by farmer 
grew up higher than price received by farmer. On the other hand, when term of trade 
grew up, at the same time the price received by farmer increase higher than price paid 
by farmer. Since terms of trade implemented from 1969, that is meant that from 1969 
price of agricultural product was higher than that of urban product.  
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Table 3.A.5: The Term of Trade for Agricultural Products, 1967-1981  
 
Year 
A 
Price Received by 
Farmer (199 Item) 
B 
Price Paid by 
Farmer (59 Items) 
A/B  
1967 9.3 10.3 90.3 
1968 10.9 12.3 88.6 
1969 12.4 13.5 91.9 
1970 14.7 15.6 94.2 
1971 17.8 17.8 100.0 
1972 21.7 20.4 106.4 
1973 24.1 22.3 108.1 
1974 31.6 30.0 105.3 
1975 39.2 37.1 105.7 
1976 48.7 46.3 105.2 
1977 56.8 54.2 104.8 
1978 74.0 70.5 105.0 
1979 82.1 80.2 102.4 
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1981 128.2 137.6 99.7 
Source: National Agricultural Cooperative Federation. Agricultural Cooperative Year 
Book 1982, National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, Seoul. 
 
 
The interpretation of table 3.A.5 is same as the above interpretation. That is because 
those two tables show the similar tendency in all columns. Even more in the over in 
overlapping period from 1967-1974 present the similar trend. 
 
III. B. Saemaul Undong: Its Ideology, Mechanism, and Performance 
 Historically, the period of initiation of Saemaul Undong has been still debatable. 
Whang (1982: 6) argued that Korean government initiated Saemaul Undong in 1970. 
Some other scholars such as  Kim and Son (Lindauer, ed, 1997:143) and Yu (Saemaul 
Undong Central Training Institute, 2000: 46) stated that Saemaul Undong was initiated 
in 1971. Ban (1975: 3) clarified about that issue by arguing that Korean government 
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initiated Saemaul Undong in 1971. One year before the initiation, in 1970 the 
government carried out pilot project of Saemaul Undong. Choe (1978: 8-12) elaborated 
that Saemaul Undong started its project in 1970. However, Choe included 
experimentation project in the first year. 
 The idea of Saemaul Undong was built by President Park (Kim, ed, 1991: 409, 
Park, 1998: 3). The objectives of Saemaul Undong, as elaborated at introduction part 
were to increase farmer income, achieve rice self-sufficiency, and to restrain migration 
flow to urban area. To achieve these goals Korean government developed Saemaul 
Undong ideology. This ideology was cultivated to modernize rural community. 
 According to Moon and Sul (Cha and others, ed, 491-492) and Moon ( Lee and 
Kim, 1991: 409) the basic ideology of Saemaul Undong was rural enlightenment. 
Through this ideology, Saemaul Undong tried to raise rural community consciousness 
on self-reliance. It aimed to promote philosophical foundation and socialize rural 
modernization. The philosophical encompassed of spirit diligent, austerity, thrift, 
cooperation, and solidarity. 
In line with Moon and Sul, Ban (1975: 12-13; Kim, ed. 1977: 213-214) 
elaborated that the ideology of Saemaul Undong was a spiritual enlightenment. The 
main purpose of spiritual enlightenment was to induce attitudinal change. This change 
consisted of effort to cultivate, self-reliance, cooperative and, and self-improvement. 
Choe (1978: 17-22) explained that the basic ideologies of Saemaul Undong were 
willingness to improve living environment and self-confidence. The willingness and 
self-confident were manifestations of human development aspects.  
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Method to cultivate the basic ideology as a philosophical foundation, according 
to Whang (1982: 13-14) was by education either in formal education or informal 
education. Through informal education, Korean government built formation of values, 
perception, and behavior. However since some obstacles to undertake formal education 
such as consuming long time and difficulty of rural people to access formal education, 
Korea government also provide non-formal education. Non-formal education consisted 
of training activities on rural health and sanitary, family planning, agricultural extension   
and leadership. 
Moon (Lee and Kim: 413-414) argued that training was a method to equip 
potential Saemaul leaders. The leaders were chosen to become agent of change in rural 
areas. In this training the Korean government encouraged trainee to participate in 
Saemaul Undong and cultivate the basic ideology as well as strategy of Saemaul 
Undong. In 1975, the training was expanded to social-political leaders such as cabinet 
member, religion leaders, professor, journalists, and manager of business corporation. 
In contrast Kihl (Hopkins, Puchala, and Talbot, ed,. 1979 : 152) expanded on 
that training delivered by government for Saemaul leaders was not to equip them  but 
for indoctrination. Government exploited the village leaders as its instrument to 
modernize rural people. Moreover, Kihl (Hopkins, Puchala, and Talbot, ed., 1979: 156) 
stated that the implementation of Saemaul Undong did not enlighten rural people but to 
maintain political support of rural people. Rural people, traditionally always contribute 
their political support into the incumbent rather to the opposition. However in the 
presidential election in 1971, rural political support to Park Chung Hee decreased. As a 
result, in the South Western part of Korea, Park Chung Hee was defeated by his 
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opposition Kim Dae Jung. Responding this falling down of political support, President 
Park launched Saemaul Undong. 
Wade (1982: 18) argued that since there was a wide gap between rural and urban 
income per household, as the expression of rural people disappointment, there was a 
decline of rural support for Park in the presidential election. This fact was one of the 
factors that suggest the incumbent to initiate Saemaul Undong.  
Meanwhile Brandt (Sung, Moon, and Perkins, ed., 1982: 275) argues that from 
the start of Saemaul Undong, Saemaul Undong had political overtones. The objective of 
Saemaul Undong was to upgrade income per household and quality of life by promoting 
cooperation, self-help, and transformation of conservative rural attitude. Even though 
government was simply invest its budget in Saemaul Undong project small proportion 
of total expenditure, the propaganda of government has been intense. That was because 
of presidential election. To get support from his people, Park had to eliminate one 
defect of his effort in developing his country, namely, wide disparity. 
Besides built Saemaul Undong ideology, Korean government also developed a 
networking system. This system covered a structural relationship from central 
government level until village level. Moon (Lee and Kim, 1991: 415-416) elaborated 
that Korean government established a well coordinated networking structure among 
government agencies. Government set up village as lowest level, Myon (township) as 
the second lowest level, afterwards county as third level, provincial level as forth level, 
and central level led by Ministry of Home Affairs was the highest level. Each level, 
from lowest to highest level had authority to carry on its responsibility. The lowest level 
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might identify its project need and proposed the project to higher level. It screened at 
the higher level and then submitted to the upper level. This procedure was repeated at 
every level and eventually would be reviewed by central government. 
From the same perspective as Moon, Whang (1981: 17-18) argued that Korean 
government built a productive role of local government. Local government had an 
authority to carry on its tasks to fit them into the village condition under the guidelines 
of central government. This system helped local government to determine their project 
need. The other advantage points was local government was more accessible to local 
people therefore easier for them to improve their relationship. 
Wade (1982:101) had a different opinion with Moon and Whang. He argued that 
local government did not have any authority to conduct any projects in its region. 
Saemaul Undong expressed a policy that directed from center. Government managed 
Saemaul Undong by utilizing local leadership as its instrument. 
Kihl (151) argument on this respect is more focus on the reason of government 
employing Ministry of Home Affairs. Instead of utilizing Ministry of Agriculture the 
Korean government employed Ministry of Home Affairs was to centralize in governing 
Saemaul Undong. Through Ministry of Home Affair, it was easier for government to 
control over Saemaul Undong. That was because Ministry of Home Affair had nation 
wide system of communication and control until village level. Unfortunately, the net 
working system did not work systematically. Since in many cases chief executive 
worked closely with village leader, thereby shortcutting intermediary structure of 
various level of government unit. 
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Brandt (Ban, Moon, and Perkins, 1982: 276-2780 argued that networking 
system built by the Korean government yielded a bluring of functional roles of agencies 
and created overlapping among institution that carry on Saemaul Undong task. It 
occurred because mo government heavily mobilize and press its official in attaining 
Saemaul Undong goals. 
Table3.B.1: Major Characteristics of Three Stages of Saemaul Undong   
 
Stages Period Major Characteristics 
- Initiation, experimentation, and building foundation 
   of Saemaul Undong. 
Preliminary 
Stage 
1970-1973 
- Projects of basic environment improvement. 
- Mobilizing villagers to participate on Saemaul 
  Undong . 
- Massive Saemaul education and training 
Popular 
Stage 
1974-1976 
- Building rural socio-economic infrastructure and  
   income-generating projects. 
- Institutionalization of Saemaul Undong 
- Major shift in project from human and social  
  development to economic development, and from  
  village projects to inter village and regional projects. 
Stable stage 1977-1981 
- Housing improvement and special reorganization  
  of village structure 
Source: Choe Yang Boo.ed. The Korean Model of Rural Saemaul Undong: Its structure, 
Strategy, anf Performance. Korea Rural Economics Institute, Seoul, 1978 
 
At practical level, the implementation of Saemaul Undong consisted of three 
stages. Choe (1978: 8-16), as presented at table 3.B.1 above, elaborate description of 
project implemented at every stage. To conduct those projects, Korean government 
listed priority of project. The priority of project is presented at table 3.B.2. This table 
clearly depict that the list of priority was more emphasized on physical infrastructures 
and beautification. 
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Table 3.B.2: Priority of Saemaul Undong Projects, Asembled by Local Administration 
Offices, 1970 
 
Order Description of projects 
1 Straightening and widening villages access roads.  
2 Reconstructing old bridges over stream. 
3 Widening and straightening village roads. 
4 Improving sewage system in village area. 
5 Replacing thatched roofs with cement made tiles. 
6 Repairing old fences of farmhouses. 
7 Improving traditional wells for drinking water. 
8 Constructing village hall. 
9 Repairing banks of brooks. 
10 Developing feeder roads to fields. 
11 Speeding up rural electrification. 
12 Installed village owned telephones 
13 Building village owned bathhouse. 
14 Constructing children playground. 
15 Improving washing place in riverside. 
16 Planting of trees and flowers for beautification. 
Source: Ministry of Home Affair Republic of Korea. Saemaul Undong, 1974. Ministry of Home 
Affair Republic of Korea, Seoul, cited by Park (Saemaul Undong Central Trainig 
Institute., 2000: 25). 
 
 
In doing so, government disposed of surplus cement to countryside in 1971 (Lee 
and Kim, 1991: 409; Lie, 1998: 110). Besides cement government also invested a 
certain amount of government budget. Table 3.B.3 implies that government supported 
for the first stage were in the amount of 41, 33, and 48 respectively. In 1971 and 1972 
all of government support were for village beautification. Meanwhile in 1973 the 
proportion of beautification project was simply 22.3 % and in 1974 was 15.6%.   
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Table 3.B.3: Gross Investment (Gross Value Formation) into Saemaul Undong Projects. 
Government Support Contribution of Inhabitant 
Year 
All Program Village beautification Total Village Beautification
1971 41 41 81 81 
1972 33 33 280 280 
1973 215 48 769 363 
1974 308 48 1,020 256 
Source: Ministry of home Affair Republic of Korea. Saemaul Undong, 1974. Ministry of Home 
Affair Republic of Korea, Seoul, 1974, cited by Ban (Kim, ed., 1977: 227). 
 
 
 Compare with another sector namely production infrastructure, income 
augmentation, and rural enlightenment; total investment in physical infrastructure is 
presented at table 3.B.4. unfortunately the data about the investment in 1971, 1972, and 
1980 are not available. Generally, the highest share of total investment was in income 
augmentation with average investment per year 39.1. The second was production 
infrastructure with average of annual investment 30.2. Physical improvement was at 
third position with annual average 25.5. Lastly was rural enlightenment, with annual 
investment averagely at 1.6. 
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Table 3.B.4: Government Support in the Saemaul Undong 1972-1981  
 
Share of Total Investment (%) 
Year 
Total 
Investment 
(109 won) 
Production 
Infrastructure
Income 
Augmentation
Environmental 
Improvement 
Rural 
Enlightenment
1972 31.6 - - - - 
1973 96.1 64.3 6.1 28.7 0.8 
1974 132.8 42.5 25.4 21.7 2.4 
1975 295.9 21.5 63.4 10.3 1.6 
1976 322.7 27.9 47.8 20.9 1.8 
1977 466.5 29.1 39.1 23.6 2.2 
1978 634.2 20.6 38.3 38.5 2.0 
1979 758.2 20.9 43.1 32.0 1.0 
1980 936.8 - - - - 
1981 702.9 15.0 49.9 28.0 2.9 
Source: Ministry of Home Affair Republic of Korea. Saemaul Undong, 1972-1982. Ministry of 
Home Affair Republic of Korea, Seoul, cited by Moon (Lee and Kim, ed., 1991: 418). 
 
 
The sources of investment, as shown by table 3.B.5 came from government 
subsidy and rural people. Total investment from 1971-1980 increased steadily and only 
dropped down in the last period. This trend was almost similar with that of government 
support and rural people efficacy. In general government subsidy was in the higher 
amount than rural people contribution. The subsidy was 3% higher than farmer efficacy. 
However, if the amount of government subsidy to Saemaul Undong compare with total 
National Government Expenditure, it is clear that that the percentage is relatively low. 
The annual average of ratio between government subsidy and total national government 
expenditure was 8.07%. 
Taking account of this fact, Brandt (Ban, Moon, and Perkins, 1982: 275) argued 
that the government investment in Saemaul Undong project was small compare with the 
total budget expenditure. The propaganda efforts, however, has been intense. 
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Table 3.B.5: Sources of Investment for Saemaul Undong Projects (Billion Won) 
 
Year 
A 
Total 
Investment 
B 
Government 
Subsidy 
C 
Private*
D 
National Govt.  
Welfare Expenditure** 
B/D 
 
1971-1972 43.5 7.4     36.1 732.4 1.0 
1973 98.4  21.5     76.9 432.8 5.0 
1974 132.8  30.8   102.0 749.1   4.1 
1975 295.9 165.3   130.6 1,062.5    15.5 
1976 322.6 165.1   157.5 1,512.7    10.9 
1977 466.5 246.0   220.5 1,969.2    12.5 
1978 634.2 338.4   295.8 2,550.8    13.3 
1979 758.2 425.2   333.0 3,845.1    11.1 
1980 936.7 415.6   521.1 4,677.4      8.9 
1981 702.9 419.4   283.5 6,433.8      6.5 
*  Paid by rural people in the form of labor, land, and cash. 
**Total National Government Expenditure 
Source: Ministry of Home Affair Republic of Korea. Saemaul Undong, 1987. Ministry of Home 
Affair Republic of Korea, Seoul, 1974, and Economic Planning Broad, Korea Statistical Year 
Book, 1971-1987) cited by Kim and Son (Lindauer, ed., 1997: 144). 
 
 
In implementing those projects, Korean government developed a mechanism to 
involve rural people. According to Yu (Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute, 
2000: 55-56) rural people responded it by participating voluntarily to Saemaul Undong 
projects.  Slogan of self-help and mutual cooperation encouraged rural community to 
participate. Rural people eagerly worked in many physical project under the banner of 
Saemaul Undong. 
Analysis of Whang (1981: 10-12) on participation was more focus on the 
decision making process. He argued that Saemaul Undong involved local people to 
participate not only in undertaking the projects but also in the process of decision-
making. The extent of participation, however, depended on their education background 
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and organizational characteristics. The higher education degree of rural people, the 
higher possibility for him/her to participate in the decision making process. 
Moon (Lee and Kim, 1991: 411-413) argued that local participation into 
Saemaul Undong was unprecedented participation. It was one of Saemaul Undong 
features that distinguished with other government policy. Statistically, there were more 
than 36,000 villages participated annually from 1975. The level of participation 
increased. In 1972 the participation was 32 million working days. In 1975 the 
participation raised to117 million workdays. The participation was getting higher at 273 
million working days in 1982. The participation was not only in the form of in the form 
working but also in the form of land, material, or cash. 
Under this participatory mechanism Saemaul Undong achieved high 
performance in realizing its goals. Ban (Kim, 1977: 232) argued that Saemaul Undong 
increased income of rural people significantly. Several projects on physical 
infrastructure and income augmentation might have efficacy directly or not directly in 
enhancing farmer income. Moreover Ban (1975:24-26) added that Saemaul Undong 
also change attitude, behavior, and lifestyle of rural community. Saemaul Undong 
raised consciousness on self-reliance, cooperation, saving and diligence. Saemaul 
Undong improved environment well as successfully encouraged rural people to invest 
in Saemaul Undong.  
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Table 3.B.6: Achievement of Environmental Program, 1971-1974  
 
Year 
Sector 
 
Unit 
 
up to 
1971 
1972 1973 1974 Total 
1. Rural road  
   -Village roads   Km  6,046 12,000 10,842 5,379  34,267
   -Farm Feeder roads   Km  27,200   7,351 5,367 39,918  79,836
2. Rural housing and environment 
   -Roof improvements  
     
  1,000    
  building 
-     413    477    400   1,290
   -Housing    Unit - - 4,407  9,154  13,561
   -Ditches improvement   Km    788  1,904 3,864  2,304   8,860
   -Public laundries   Projects 24,129  9,035 14,049  4,984  52,197
3. Rural water supply systems  
   -Water supply works   Villages    235 2,640   2,556  4,556    9,988
   - Public wells   Projects 65,419 20,350 19,533 4,373 109,675
4. National beautification 
   - Road beautification   Km -   1,158 736    318    2,212
   - Town beautification   Towns -    108 145      36       289
   - Resort beautification   Projects -        7    6       5         18
   - Embankment of river    Km -    788 1,315    741    2,844
5. Public facilities 
   -Village halls   Buildings 13,494 4,452  5,135 1,545   24,626
   -Public bathhouses   Buildings   2,111 2,063  1,390    351     5,915
   -Medical treatment by 
mobile medical units 
  1000 
  persons 
  4,148 3,702  2,601 2,553   13,004
Source: Ministry of Interior. Saemaul Undong, 1974. Ministry of Interior. Korea, Seoul, cited 
by Ban (1975: 30). 
 
Moon (Lee and Kim, 1991: 419-421) divided Saemaul Undong performance 
into four categories namely: achievement on environment, farm income, employment, 
and saving. In terms of performance on environment, the achievement was an 
improvement of physical infrastructure as depicted by table 3.B.6 presented above. On 
the second performance, from 1970-1976 farmer income increased at rate of 9.5% per 
year. At the same time, Saemaul Undong absorbed rural workers in its projects. That 
was the third performance. The last performance, Saemaul Undong raised the rate of 
55 
saving in rural area. In 1960s saving income was less than 10% but after the initiation of 
Saemaul Undong, saving rate was more than 20%. 
 
Table 3.B.7: Achievement of Income and Production Augmentation Program, 1971-
1974  
 
Year 
Sector 
 
Unit 
 
up to 1971 1972 1973 1974 Total 
1. Construction of production infrastructures 
-Land rearrangements Hectares 26,953 23,134 24,300 1,208 75,595
   -Irrigation facilities Projects -   4,102    5,393 9,416 18,911
   -Public warehouses Buildings -   1,699    1,601 5,946   9,246
   -Public compost pits Projects 51,793   3,097    1,522 3,590 60,002
-Public workshop Projects -     985       218     841   2,044
-Common use barns Projects -     757       162     405   1,324
2. Joint production activities 
   -Collective cultivation 1,000 ha -    206      317     383     906 
   -Compost production 1,000 M/T - - 32,124 32,484 64,608
   -Joint control of in- 
    sects and diseases 
1,000 ha  5,093  5,801    6,879   7,812 25,585
3. Other  
   -Reforestation  Hectares 231,159 -  12,385 39,955 283,499
   -Nursery stocks  
    cultivation     
Million 
trees 
- -         86      203        289
   -Rural electrification 
 
1000 
household 
    848    164       308      177     1,497
   -Communication  
     network 
Projects  4,176    463       700      706     6,045
Source: Ministry of Interior. Saemaul Undong, 1974. Ministry of Interior. Korea, Seoul, cited 
by Ban (1975: 31). 
 
  
Ban (Kim, 1977: 221-222) argued that the performances of Saemaul Undong 
were in three facets: environment, income and production augmentation, and spiritual 
enlightenment. The description of performances is presented in table 3.b.6, 3.B.7, and 
3.B.8. According to Ban, the indicators for the performance are: first, quantity of 
56 
environmental completed physical projects. Table 3.B.6 shows that it consisted of 
kilometers of rural road constructed, unit of housing built, and so forth. Second is 
number of persons who participating in the movement. It could be seen from the 
amount of labor absorbed by Saemaul Undong projects. Third indicator is assessment of 
monetary value of Saemaul Undong projects.  
 
Table 3.B.8: Achievement of Spiritual Enlightenment, 1971-1974  
 
Year 
Sector 
 
Unit 
 
up to 
1971 1972 1973 1974 Total 
1.Saving programs 
    -Postal savings Million won 1,082 2,276 8,293 11,600 23,251
    -Deposits in village’s  
     safe 
Million won 2,650 3,530 6,820   7,173 20,173
2.Family planning 
      -Mobile medical  
       service groups 
units -     22      21        11        54
      -Sterilization 1,000 persons -     20      22       34         76
      -Vasectomy 1,000 persons -   300     300     383       983
      -Contraceptives 1,000 persons -   400     442     424    1,266
3. Improvement of living condition 
      -Improvement of food Villages -     90     126      597       813
      -Education for wives. Participants -   200 35,384 40,930   76,514
Source: Ministry of Interior. Saemaul Undong, 1974. Ministry of Interior. Korea, Seoul, cited 
by Ban (1975: 32). 
 
In contrast, Brandt (Sung, Pal, and Perkins, eds., 1982:277) argued that the 
Korean government conducted Saemaul Undong in coercive method. Coercive pressure 
from local government official to farmer generated resentment. Moreover, farmers were 
less enthusiasm to be involved in any Saemaul Undong program. That was because 
Saemaul Undong conducted through top down mechanism. Many projects were 
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designed and decided by government without involving local people. In this 
circumstance most of the project were not match with local people need. 
 In line with Brandt, Kihl (Hopkins, Puchala, and Talbot, ed., 1979: 153) argue 
that authoritarian coercive mechanism caused the emergence of resentment as well as 
cynicism. Most of farmers tend to less enthusiasm to participate to any projects under 
the banner of Saemaul Undong. Farmer did not trust to any campaigns conducted by 
local official. 
Wade (1982: 98-99) elaborated that in many cases of implementation of 
Saemaul Undong, official showed coercive pressure to farmer. Before the time to 
cultivate paddy, government indicated the quota target for every province as well as 
determine the variety of paddy that should be planted by farmer. If farmer did not plant 
the variety as determined by government, officials would destroy the seedbed. Under 
this circumstance, many farmers were wary to be involved in any government program 
related to Saemaul Undong. 
 
III.C. Dual Price Policy: Its Characteristics and performance 
The other Korean agricultural policy which had the same objective as Saemaul 
Undong was dual price policy. Similar as Saemaul Undong, the aim of dual price policy 
was to increase farmer income. In addition dual price policy was also tried to increase 
agricultural terms of trade in favor of farmer (Kruger, Schiff, and Valdes, ed., 1991: 27) 
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Through dual price policy Korean government purchased rice from farmer at 
higher price than the price when government sale rice to urban people (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 1999: 48; Hopkins, Puchala, and Talbot, ed., 
1979: 159; Kruger, Schiff, and Valdes, ed., 1991: 27) Between purchasing price and 
selling price, there was a difference. Most of the differences were not profits of 
government but losses of government. This loss was the subsidy provided by 
government to farmer as well as to urban people as the consumer of rice (Kim, 1977: 
231). 
The main idea of dual price policy was actually a policy that tried to solve a 
dilemma as stated by Ban, Moon, and Perkins below: 
“Under the single-price system, if the government attempts to increase 
production and reduce consumption of rice in order to keep the aggregate 
demand and supply of rice in balance while importing less foreign rice, both the 
purchase and selling price must be maintained at a relatively high level. The 
resulting high price of rice certainly contributes to increasing farm revenue as 
well as to saving foreign exchange through reduction in rice consumption, but 
high rice prices also will cause an upward pressure on general price level and an 
adverse effect upon urban consumer welfare. A two price system for rice and 
barley, a higher price for farmer and a lower price for urban consumers was one 
means of resolving this dilemma and attaining simultaneously these apparently 
conflicting objectives.” (Ban, Moon, and Perkins, 1982: 246) 
 
In fact, dual price policy provided subsidy not only for rice but also for barley. 
Even more the subsidy for barley was higher than the subsidy for rice.(Ban, Moon, and 
Perkins, 1982: 247). Before 1969 price of barley was about 65% of rice price. After 
1969, due to the subsidy, price of barley dropped to 50% of rice prices (Kruger, Schiff, 
and Valdes, ed., 1991: 56) Korean government attempted to keep price of barley at low 
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level to encourage Korean people to consume barley more than rice (Anderson, 1987: 
19). This fact implies that government protected rice higher than barley. 
The consequences of the subsidy provided by dual price policy were two types. 
They were advantage and disadvantages effects. The advantages effect would be 
elaborate at the next part. Meanwhile the disadvantage effect was financial problem 
caused by subsidy that government had to pay. Due to the subsidy provided by 
government, it raised government expenditure. The increasing expenditure resulted a 
deficit in food grain management fund (Anderson,1987: 19).  From 1970-1986 the total 
loss of financial amounted to 2,707 billion won (Kruger, Schiff, and Valdes, ed., 1991: 
56). Since this deficit, in 1993 Korean government abolished Food Grain Management 
Fund that provided financial support for dual price policy (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 1999: 49). 
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IV. Saumaul Undong: Its Contribution and Political Motive behind its Initiation  
 
IV.A Saemaul Undong: Its Contribution in Increasing Farmer’s Income  
Rural community income, as mentioned at previous part grew up from 1966-
1981 (see table 3.A.2). Even when the output of agriculture dropped down, farmer 
income still grew up. It was also happened to the surplus of income and agricultural 
terms of trade. Even though rice production was fluctuate, the surplus of income from 
1966-1978 as well as agricultural terms of trade from 1969-1973 increased steadily (see 
table 3.A.4 and 3.A.5). That is meant that there was a third variable as determinant that 
raised rural people income. In this sense two policies elaborated above were possible 
the determinant.  That was because both of them had the same objective, namely to 
enhance farmer income. This part try to scrutinize and find out which policy increased 
farmer income.  
It is interesting phenomenon that income of farmer increased at longer period 
time than the surplus of income. Term of trade, on the other hand increase at a stable 
trend was in the shortest time. It could be interpreted that the rate of production did not 
have any relationship with the surplus of income as well as term of trade. The second 
interpretation is that that living expenditure of farmer in that period was relatively high. 
The high living expenditure caused the surplus of income fluctuated even though the 
farmer household income was increase steadily. Since term of trade trend was also as 
not as stable that of farmer household income, it was possible that price of urban 
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product higher than price agricultural output. That was because during 1970s there were 
first and second oil shock. Those oil shock raised price urban product paid by farmer 
(Jacob, 1985: 110).  
Taking account those facts, considering living expenditures as a variable in this 
analysis is relatively important. The reason is because that is the main distinguished 
features between Saemaul Undong and dual price policy. During the implementation of 
Saemaul Undong farmer had to spend a fix expend to contribute in Saemaul Undong 
projects. Not only did to contribute in many Saemaul Undong projects but also to 
purchase many agricultural product in urban*. It significantly raised to farmer living 
expenditure as argue by Adelman and Robinson: 
“After final equilibrium is reached, the average price level is 5 percent above the 
base run, and the terms of trade are raised by the full amount of the change in 
agricultural price (25 percent). The real incomes of rural households go up 9-19 
percent, with the richer group gaining relatively more. Total agricultural income 
does not  rise by the full 25 percent because the increase in relative price of 
agricultural goods raises the cost of living by more than the increase in the 
whole price index, and this effect is more serious for rural household, which 
spend relatively on agricultural goods. The cost of living raises about 10-12 
percent for rural group, but only 7-9 percent for urban group” (Adelman and 
Robinson, 1978: 85)   
 
Meanwhile in case of dual price policy, this policy did not involve any fix cost 
bore by farmer. The only thing that farmers had to do was simply sell their rice to 
government. The second reason is because Korean farming production expense was 
                                                 
* Saemaul Undong tried to increase farmer income through raising agricultural production. To 
enhance productivity farmers had to purchase high yield variety, pesticide, and fertilizer. Those 
three agricultural inputs are parts of green revolution characteristics (Szirmai, 1997: 265) Since 
limited land resources; Korean government tends to increase agricultural productivity by 
increasing utility of fertilizer. It is accompanied by the government efforts to promote high yield 
variety: tongil in early 1970s 
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expensive. Korean agricultural cost was one of the most expensive in the world. In the 
late of 1960s, the agricultural cost price of Korean agricultural was three times the 
world price (Adelman and Robinson, 1978: 85). 
Generally speaking that output of agricultural sector derive from agricultural 
productivity. The higher the productivity, the higher possibility of agricultural sector to 
get a higher production. Comparing agricultural productivity (see table 4.A.1),  
agricultural output, and  rural household income (see table 3.A.2), it seem that all of the 
variable mentioned above do not inter-connected. It is in line with Adelman and 
Robinson (1978: 86) opinion. They stated that there was no relationship between 
Korean agricultural productivity and the enhancement of rural people income. Table 
4.A.1 reveals that labor productivity and land productivity on one side compare with 
rice output and the surplus of income on the other side have different trend. Labor 
productivity and land productivity show a stable trend: except in 1965, it increased 
steadily. On the other hand rice production fluctuated in the entire period. Meanwhile 
trend the surplus of income was in between in rice production and labor productivity as 
well as land productivity.  
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Table 4.A.1 Living Expenses (Average per Household in Won) 
 
Year Agricultural Capital 
Labor 
Productivity 
Land 
Productivity 
Capital 
Productivity 
1962 90,602 21 6,070 0.60 
1963 120,198 37 8,533 0.64 
1964 102,707 49 11,413 1.01 
1965 79,831 43 9,261 1.11 
1966 126,525 49 10,699 0.80 
1967 146,500 58 11,934 0.79 
1968 181,861 73 13,707 0.75 
1969 226,759 91 16,780 0.74 
1970 260,768 107 19,639 0.74 
1971 360,126 159 29,338 0.81 
1972 461,806 200 35,551 0.77 
1973 547,021 223 39,071 0.71 
1974 750,801 378 56,040 0.72 
1975 970,698 467 74,307 0.74 
1976 1,248,033 575 95,066 0.74 
1977 1,549,147 660 103,614 0.67 
1978 1,881,586 855 133,432 0.72 
1979 2,277,508 926 150,865 0.67 
1980 2,497,079 1,061 170,868 0.70 
1981 3,203,159 1,454 236,756 0.77 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Republic of Korea. Report on the Results of Farm 
Household Economy Survey 1972 and 1982, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
Republic of Korea, Seoul 
 
This unclear relationship among variables elaborated above, does not give 
significant clue about the relationship between both two policies and enhancement of 
rural people’s income. Analyzing farmer household income presented by table 3.A.2 
through dividing the entire period into 1961-1969, 1970-1970, 1971-1973, 1974-1976, 
and 1977-1981, it seem that there was no clear symptoms refer to the efficacy of dual 
price policy and Saemaul Undong to enhance rural people income. From 1965-1969, 
1970-1970, 1971-1973, 1974-1976 the trend were similar. Farmer household income 
increased almost in the same degree. That is meant that before initiation of dual price 
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policy as well as Saemaul Undong and during the implementation of both policies there 
was no different significant changes. Therefore the analysis should go beyond these 
data. 
In addition the definition of income, as elaborated at theoretical framework, 
does not refer to the above data. Since Saemaul Undong involve a certain cost paid by 
farmer the data that should be scrutinized is the surplus of income and rate of 
agriculture income. The other important data is agricultural term of trade. The reason is 
because the real farmer income should reflect farmer’ purchasing power. One of a 
plausible indicator to measure real purchasing power is agricultural term of trade. 
Moreover, the problematic issue during the initiation Saemaul Undong was about a 
different purchasing power between urban workers and farmer. Since terms of trade is a 
concept that cover price of rural and urban products so this research will scrutinize 
agricultural terms of trade. 
Data on the surplus of income presented by table 3.A.3 reveals another feature. 
It might be interpreted that both dual price policy and Saemaul Undong rose farmer 
income. It seem that from 1966-1978 the income grew up steadily. Hence, the trend was 
not different from that of farmer household income. However, if the data are scrutinized 
deeply the enhancement started from 1968, one year before the initiation of dual-price 
policy. That was because income growth from 1965-1967 was actually still expressing a 
declining trend compare with achievement in 1964. Based on this argument the 
unwavering growth started from 1968 to 1978. 
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Moon (Kim 231-232) argued that rural community income increased due to dual 
price policy as well as Saemaul Undong. Saemaul Undong increased farmer income 
through several project such as construction of infrastructure, environmental 
improvement and income augmentation. In his analysis of secondary data Moon argued 
that  
“…..that the growth rate of farm household income has been higher since 1970 
when the New Community Movement (Saemaul Undong) was initiated than in 
the prior period. It is interesting to notice that growth of farm income has 
accelerated while that of urban wage earners has decelerated leading to near 
equal income levels between a farm and an urban salary-wage earners’ 
household. The equality in income levels between two different categories of 
households might have resulted from the commitment of various government 
programs as well as the increased mobility of people”  (Kim 232) 
 
In line with Moon, Whang (1981: 180) expanded that Saemaul Undong was not 
the only factors resulted rural income enhancement. Subsidy provided by dual price 
policy had remarkable economic effect throughout 1970s. Dual price policy was 
undoubtedly the major determinant of increasing rural community income. In this case 
Saemaul Undong has partly upgraded rural people income. 
It is interesting to investigate on Moon’s argument. He stated that Saemaul 
Undong increased income through some project and that the upgrading of income 
started in 1970. Based on the assumption that Saemaul Undong project aimed to raise 
farmer income started in 1974, performance in 1970 should not be considered as 
performance belongs to Saemaul Undong but as performance of dual price policy.  
Table 4.A.2 depicts that agricultural expenditure determine rate of agricultural 
income. Both agricultural gross receive and agricultural expenditure shows almost the 
same trend. Agricultural gross receive dropped somewhat in 1965 and then increased 
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continuously until 1981. Agricultural expenditure decreased in 1964 and from 1965-
1981 grew up steadily. Rate of agricultural income had similar trend with that of 
agricultural gross receive. Interestingly ratio between agricultural income and 
agricultural gross receive had different trend with the gross receive as well as 
agricultural income. From 1962-1964, agricultural income increased and then from 
1965 dropped down continuously until 1967. From 1968-1974 rate of agricultural 
income increased unwaveringly, declined in 1973, and grew up in 1974.  Rate of 
agricultural income, then from 1975-1980 decreased steadily and eventually declined in 
the last period.  
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Table 4.A.2: Farm Household Income (Average per Household in Won). 
  
Year 
A 
Agricultural Gross
Receipts 
B 
Agricultural 
Expenditures 
C 
Agricultural 
Income 
C/A 
Rate of 
Agricultural 
Income 
1962 73,416 19,390 54,026 73.6 
1963 100,925 24,383 76,542 75.8 
1964 128,072 24,327 103,745 81.0 
1965 115,991 27,179 88,812 76.6 
1966 131,407 29,977 101,430 77.2 
1967 150,995 34,636 116,359 77.1 
1968 177,083 40,147 136,936 77.3 
1969 214,617 47,489 167,128 77.9 
1970 248,064 54,027 194,037 78.2 
1971 356,567 64,658 291,909 81.9 
1972 427,994 74,613 353,381 82.6 
1973 480,263 89,943 390,320 81.3 
1974 664,411 122,509 541,902 81.6 
1975 890,954 176,116 714,838 80.2 
1976 1,165,956 244,763 921,193 79.0 
1977 1,333,586 297,450 1,036,136 77.7 
1978 1,769,116 413,448 1,355,668 76.6 
1979 2,027,162 495,887 1,531,275 75.5 
1980 2,342,169 587,353 1,754,816 74.9 
1981 3,269,433 792,970 2,476,463 75.7 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Republic of Korea. Report on the Results of Farm 
Household Economy Survey 1972 and 1982, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Republic of 
Korea, Seoul. 
 
The phenomenon above reveals that rate of agricultural expenditure in the 
period of declining rate of income was highly increased. In this case, there is an 
interesting finding. From the starting of dual price policy until 1972, agricultural 
expenditure did not significantly stipulate rate of income. However, after 
implementation of Saemaul Undong, particularly after entering the second stage of 
Saemaul Undong, which focused on increasing income, rate of agricultural income 
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dropped down. That is meant that those projects caused agricultural expenditure 
increased. It resulted rate of agricultural income declined. 
Table 4.A.3 is relatively helpful to make sure the significance influence of 
agricultural expenditure to rate of agricultural income. In 1973, when rate of 
agricultural income dropped down, rural people efficacy into Saemaul Undong 
increased more than 200%. Its proportion was almost 400% of government subsidy. The 
other interesting phenomenon was that when the contribution to Saemaul Undong 
increased rate of agricultural income decline. It is clear that from 1975-1980, rural 
people contribution grew up and dropped down in 1981. In contrast trend of rate of 
agricultural income is on the opposite tendency. Rate of agricultural income declined 
from 1975-1980 and eventually increased in 1981. 
Table 4.A.3: Sources of Investment for Saemaul Undong Projects (Billion Won) 
 
Year 
A 
Total 
Investment 
B 
Government 
Subsidy 
C 
Farmer 
Contribution*
D 
National Govt.  
Welfare Expenditure** 
B/D 
 
1971-1972 43.5 7.4     36.1 732.4 1.0 
1973 98.4  21.5     76.9 432.8 5.0 
1974 132.8  30.8   102.0 749.1 4.1 
1975 295.9 165.3   130.6 1,062.5  15.5 
1976 322.6 165.1   157.5 1,512.7  10.9 
1977 466.5 246.0   220.5 1,969.2  12.5 
1978 634.2 338.4   295.8 2,550.8  13.3 
1979 758.2 425.2   333.0 3,845.1  11.1 
1980 936.7 415.6   521.1 4,677.4    8.9 
1981 702.9 419.4   283.5 6,433.8 6.5 
*  Paid by rural people in the form of labor, land, and cash. 
**Total National Government Expenditure 
Source: Ministry of Home Affair Republic of Korea. Saemaul Undong, 1987. Ministry of Home 
Affair Republic of Korea, Seoul, 1974, and Economic Planning Broad, Korea 
Statistical Year Book, 1971-1987) cited by Kim and Son (Lindauer, ed., 1997: 144). 
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However, since the efficacy may not in the form of cash, it is not plausible to 
develop argument simply relying on this fact. To investigate more detail, it is necessary 
to scrutinize data that reveals farmer expenditure on contribution to Saemaul Undong in 
the form of cash. Table 4.A.4 and table 4.A.5 are relatively helpful to clarify that farmer 
expenditure were high when rate of income dropped down.  
Table 4.A.4 Ratio Sanitation and Beauty Expenses to Living Expenses 
 
Year 
A 
Living Expenses
B 
Miscellaneous 
Expenses 
C 
Sanitation and 
Beauty 
C/B 
1962 55,739 10,829 376 3.5 
1963 77,464 13,317 499 3.8 
1964 101,118 19,631 685 3.5 
1965 100,492 22,866 738 3.2 
1966 109,878 25,354 802 3.2 
1967 127,667 30,347 1,040 3.4 
1968 143,104 34,066 1,225 3.6 
1969 171,371 43,636 1,523 3.5 
1970 207,766 55,648 1,921 3.5 
1971 244,463 61,815 2,414 3.9 
1972 309,665 78,924 2,748 3.5 
1973 337,350 84,057 3,604 4.3 
1974 435,490 102,018 4,218 4.1 
1975 616,280 162,299 5,926 3.7 
1976 749,183 191,201 7,689 4.0 
1977 976,407 279,659 9,193 3.3 
1978 1,320,508 442,369 12,062 2.7 
1979 1,662,168 564,404 17,210 3.1 
1980 2,138,323 774,831 22,516 2.9 
1981 2,676,090 976,271 26,479 2.7 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Republic of Korea. Report on the Results of Farm 
Household Economy Survey 1972 and 1982, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Republic of 
Korea, Seoul. 
 
 Table 4.A.4 about sanitation and beauty expenses would be used to clarify 
farmer expenses in 1973 and table 4.A.5 would be employed to clarify rural people 
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expenditure in 1975.The reason is, in 1973 Saemaul Undong focused on its projects on 
beautification and physical infrastructure meanwhile in 1975 emphasized on income 
generation through enhancement of agricultural production. Table 4.A.4 clearly presents 
that that sanitation and beautification expenses in 1973 was high. Its ratio in 
miscellaneous expenses was the highest during 1962-1981.    
Table 4.A.5: Agricultural Management Expenditures (Average per Household) 
 
Year 
Seed and 
Seeding 
Agricultural 
Expenditures Fertilizer Pesticide Irrigation 
1962   1,534 18,820   6,326    148 665 
1963   2,667 25,147   7,441    295 632 
1964   1,322 22,884   5,232    390 917 
1965   1,459 26,711   8,288    521 1,081 
1966      828 28,261   8,839    733 1,464 
1967      799 33,209   8,631    936 2,062 
1968      935 38,265   8,997  1,177 2,044 
1969   1,175 45,896   9,861  1,716 2,577 
1970   1,850 52,539 10,158  2,373 3,001 
1971   2,353 61,037 10,182  3,432 3,408 
1972   2,148 74,613 13,059  4,005 2,496 
1973   2,336 89,943 15,108   5,303 3,681 
1974   5,049 122,509 17,111   5,713 3,539 
1975   6,329 176,116 27,038 13,156 5,000 
1976   7,907 244,763 48,367 14,709 6,797 
1977 13,071 297,450 53,056 17,845 10,278 
1978 19,655 413,448 63,790 25,427 13,547 
1979 18,179 495,887 52,900 33,138 19,696 
1980 26,841 587,353 59,084 47,207 18,809 
1981 36,861 792,970 94,059 55,219 29,427 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Republic of Korea. Report on the Results of Farm 
Household Economy Survey 1972 and 1982, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Republic of 
Korea, Seoul. 
Similarly, table 4.A.5 depicts that fertilizer, pesticide, and irrigation expenses 
grew up highly in 1975. Fertilizer expenses increased at rate of 158%, irrigation grew 
up 141%, and pesticide raised 230%. Meanwhile seeding expenses in 1975 was not high. 
It simply increased 125%. Seeding expenses was on its peak in 1974, which achieved 
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216%. Due to the upgrading of fertilizer, pesticide, and irrigation expenses, total 
agricultural expenditure increased highly. The magnitude of total agricultural expenses 
in 1975 was the highest throughout the period. 
From that analysis, it is clear that there is a relationship between enhancements 
of expenses to participate Saemaul Undong to the decline of rate of agricultural income. 
In other words, without Saemaul Undong, the expenses would not as high as shown by 
those data scrutinized above. However, it is too few to conclude that only dual price 
policy that raised income of farmer. To come to the conclusion the analysis would go 
deeply to how much efficacy the subsidy provided dual price policy to rate of 
agricultural income and term of trade.  
Table 4.A.6 reveals the amount of subsidy provided by dual price policy. The 
data on subsidy shows that during the period of conducting dual price policy the subsidy 
was higher than previous period. In 1969, even though the subsidy was still minus, but 
it increased 300% than that of 1968. In the other periods, it is clear that in 1970, 1972, 
1973, and 1975 the subsidy were in plus value. Throughout the period of 1969-1975, 
the subsidy was averagely 362.29 per year. Therefore, it is clear that after initiation of 
dual price policy subsidy of rice was higher than before the initiation. 
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Table 4.A.6: Government Purchase versus Selling Prices for Rice, 1956-1975  (Won per    
80kg) 
 
Year 
A 
Purchase Price 
B 
Selling Price 
A-B  
Subsidy B/A 
 
1961 1,550 1,792 -242 115.6 
1962 1,650 1,888 -238 114.4 
1963 2,060 2,312 -252 112.2 
1964 2,967 3,450 -483 116.3 
1965 3,150 3,350 -200 106.3 
1966 3,306 3,900 -594 118.0 
1967 3,590 4,100 -510 114.2 
1968 4,200 5,200 -1,000 123.8 
1969 5,150 5,470 -320 106.2 
1970 7,000 6,500 500 92.9 
1971 8,750 9,500 -750 108.6 
1972 9,888 9,500 388 96.1 
1973 11,372 11,264 108 99.1 
1974 15,760 15,850 -90 100.6 
1975 19,500 16,800 2,700 86.2 
Source: Food Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and fisheries Republic of Korea. Cited by Ban, 
Moon, and Perkins (1980: 247). 
 
 
As a result of providing subsidy was agricultural term of trade grew up. Table 
4.A.7 and table 4.A.8 show the trend of agricultural term of trade. Discerning table 
4.A.7, it is clear that from 1963 term of trade declined continuously until 1968. From 
the period of initiation of dual price policy, in 1969, term of trade grew up steadily until 
1973, declined somewhat in 1974, wavered in the period of 1974-1978, and then 
eventually declined unwaveringly until 1981. 
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Table 4.A.7: The Term of Trade for Agricultural Products, 1963-1974 
 
Year 
A 
Price Received by 
Farmer (140 Item) 
B 
Price Paid by  
Farmer (49 Item) 
A/B  
1963 40.1 35.3 113.6 
1964 50.2 44.8 112.1 
1965 52.2 51.8 100.8 
1966 55.4 58.1 95.4 
1967 63.5 65.8 96.5 
1968 74.3 78.8 94.3 
1969 84.8 86.8 97.7 
1970 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1971 121.4 114.4 106.1 
1972 147.9 130.5 113.3 
1973 164.2 143.1 114.7 
1974 215.6 192.5 112.0 
Source: National Agricultural Cooperative Federation. Agricultural Cooperative Year Book 
1975, National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, Seoul. 
 
 
After 1969, term of trade increased because the high price paid by government 
through dual price policy raised price received by farmer. Since policies to upgrade 
agricultural output caused deterioration of agricultural term of trade (Adelman and 
Robinson1978: 84), it is clear that Saemaul Undong  which tried to stimulate 
agricultural production decreased term of trade. 
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Table 4.A.8: The Term of Trade for Agricultural Products, 1967-1981  
 
Year 
A 
Price Received by 
Farmer (199 Item) 
B 
Price Paid by 
Farmer (59 Items) 
A/B  
1967 9.3 10.3 90.3 
1968 10.9 12.3 88.6 
1969 12.4 13.5 91.9 
1970 14.7 15.6 94.2 
1971 17.8 17.8 100.0 
1972 21.7 20.4 106.4 
1973 24.1 22.3 108.1 
1974 31.6 30.0 105.3 
1975 39.2 37.1 105.7 
1976 48.7 46.3 105.2 
1977 56.8 54.2 104.8 
1978 74.0 70.5 105.0 
1979 82.1 80.2 102.4 
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1981 128.2 137.6 99.7 
Source: National Agricultural Cooperative Federation. Agricultural Cooperative Year Book 
1982, National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, Seoul. 
  
Based on the analysis on the agricultural the surplus of income, rate of 
agricultural income, and agricultural term of trade above, the determinant of increasing 
rural people income was dual price policy. In other words, without initiation of Saemaul 
Undong in 1971, rural community income has already increased from 1969. This 
interpretation in accordance with Kihl’s (Hopkins, Puchala, and Talbot, eds., 1979:  
161)  as well as  Kim’s and Son’s (Lindauer, 1997: 140) opinions. They argued that 
dual price policy was the variable that increased farmer income. 
In line with the above scholars’ argument, Moon (Lee and Kim, 1991; 392) 
elaborated that dual price policy was the policy that increased rural people income. It 
could be seen on the fact that during the period of 1962-1982 agricultural income grew 
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up in period in which dual price policy provide high subsidy and declined when the 
subsidy was low. This implies that  that dual price policy was the most critical factor in 
upgrading farmer income. 
In the same opinion, Wade (1982: 147) expanded on his argument that dual 
price policy was the factor that raised rural community income. Some other programs, 
such as Saemaul Undong, were a manifestation of coercion and mobilization to achieve 
its goal. It was not a method to increase rural income in the process of rural 
development.   
 
IV. B. Saemaul Undong: Its Contribution in Achieving Rice Self Sufficiency 
 Food self-sufficiency has been the major objective of Korean agricultural 
policies since ancient time (Saemaul Undong Center Training Institute: 2000: 94). The 
institutionalization of this major objective was in the same period of the initiation of 
Saemaul Undong. Korean government put rice self-sufficiency as one of the priority 
targets in the third economic plan implemented in 1971-1976 (Wade, 1982: 18). 
 Many indicators expressed that Korean government was seriously attempted to 
attain rice self-sufficiency. One of the measures was the budget spent by government. In 
the second five years plan, Korean government simply allocated 6% of total budget into 
agricultural sector. To achieve rice self-sufficiency, in the third five years plan the 
budget on agriculture grew up to almost 17% of total budget (Kim,1977: 23). 
 Not only did in the form budget the government the indicator was but also in the 
form of strategies. According to Wade (1982: 18-19) in order to attain rice self-
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sufficiency, Korean government implemented four strategies. First, Korean government 
initiated high yielding paddy varieties in 1970 to distribute new seeds and high level 
fertilizer. Second built physical-agricultural infrastructure. Third, initiated dual price 
policy. The last strategy, Korean government launched Saemaul Undong. 
 From Wade argument above, it seem that both dual price policy and Saemaul 
Undong aimed to achieve rice self-sufficiency. This part would investigate which one of 
two strategies mentioned above was the factor that raised income of farmer. 
Table 4.B.1 reveals rate of rice self sufficiency from 1961-1994. The table 
shows that from 1961-1994 that most of rate of self-sufficiency less than 100. Only in 
1990 rate of rice self-sufficiency were more than 100. From 1961-1980 rate of rice self 
sufficiency declined. In fact that rate of rice self sufficiency in 1980 was higher than in 
1970. However if compare with the attainment in 1961 was lower.  
Table 4.B.1: Rate of Self-Sufficiency for Rice 
Year Rate of Self Sufficiency for Rice (%) 
1961 98.5 
1970 96.4 
1980 97.3 
1990 107.5 
1994 95.4 
 
Sources: Ministry of Agriculture and fisheries Republic of Korea. Year Book of Agriculture and 
Forestry Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture and fisheries Republic of Korea, Seoul. 
Cited by Moon and Sul, (Cha and others, ed,  1997: 475). 
 
Since Korea attained rice self-sufficiency in 1990, 9 years after Korean 
government abolished Saemaul Undong, it is clear that Saemaul Undong did not help 
Korea to achieved rice self-sufficiency. The indicator was during the period of 
conducting Saemaul Undong, Korea did not attain rice self-sufficiency. Hence, the 
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determinant which enable Korea to achieve rice self-sufficiency was dual price policy. 
Many scholars such as moon and sul (Cha and others, 1997; 489), Kim and Son 
(Lindauer, 1997: 143), and Kihl (Hopkins, Puchala, and Talbot, ed., 1979: 160) argued 
the same idea as the above interpretation. They stated that the achievement of rice self-
sufficiency in 1990 was due to dual price policy. 
 
4.C. Saemaul Undong: Its Contribution in Restraining Migration Flow from Rural 
to Urban Areas 
As elaborated above at previous part, one of the objectives of Saemaul Undong 
was to restrain off farm migration which caused a potentially unstable marginal on the 
urban peripheries. Table 4.C.1 depicts the problematic phenomenon before the initiation 
of Saemaul Undong. From 1961-1966 migration flow into urban area was 1,591. This 
magnitude of rural people who migrated to urban grew up 153% in the period of 1966-
1970 to 2,321. In contrast net migration from urban to rural area drop down 140%. 
From 1960-1966 migration into rural area was –1,660 and in 1966-1970 was –2,321. 
 
Table 4.C.1: Trend of Population in Rural and Urban Area, 1961-1970 
 
Number (in 1,000) Net migration rate (%) Year 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 
1961-1966 1,591 -1,660 16.3 -8.6 
1966-1970 2,321 -2,321 20.4          -12.3 
Source: UN, ESCAP, 1975: 154. cited by Lee (1980: 17). 
 
This fact caused the similar trend of migration rate. Net migration rate into 
urban area was 16.30 in 1960-1966. From 1966-1970 the net migration rate was 204. It 
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grew up 125%. On the other hand net migration rate into rural area on the opposite 
tendency. It declined from –8.6 in period of 1960-1966 to –12.3 in 1966-1970. 
As a result the number of people who engaged in rural sector declined in the 
above period. As shown by table 4.C.2, it is clear that from 1960-1966 population of 
farmer declined unwaveringly. It also happened in the period of 1966-1970. The 
declining population of farm household continued until 1981. Since the total household 
increased steadily from 1961-1981, it yielded the ratio between farm household and 
total household decreased unwaveringly in that period. 
Table 4.C.2: Ratio Farm Household Population to Total Population 
 
Year A Total Household 
B 
Farm Household 
B/A 
1961 4,343,727 2,327,116 53.6 
1962 4,589,071 2,469,453 58.2 
1963 4,688,231 2,415,593 51.5 
1964 4,769,533 2,450,308 51.4 
1965 4,844,439 2,506,899 51.7 
1966 5,191,507 2,540,274 49.6 
1967 5,101,040 2,586,864 50.7 
1968 5,233,958 2,578,526 49.3 
1969 5,415,516 2,546,244 47.0 
1970 5,864,330 2,487,646 42.4 
1971 - 2,481,525 - 
1972 - 2,451,844 - 
1973 - 2,450,277 - 
1974 - 2,381,200 - 
1975 6,754,257 2,379,058 35.2 
1976 - 2,335,856 - 
1977 - 2,303,930 - 
1978 - 2,223,807 - 
1979 - 2,161,821 - 
1980 7,969,201 2,155,073 27.0 
1981 - 2,029,626 - 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Republic of Korea. Year Book of Agriculture and 
Forestry Statistics 1972 and 1982, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Republic of 
Korea, Seoul. 
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From another point of view, it could be predicted that the proportion between 
rural and urban population would be shift. Table 4.C.3 shows that from 1960-1988 
populations in city that include Seoul and six largest cities grew up. In contrast, in the 
same period population in rural area declined. In 1960 population in rural was higher 
than that of urban area. In 1980 the situation shifted oppositely. Population in urban 
area was higher than in rural area. 
Table 4.C.3:Regional population Trends (1,000 persons) 
 
Year 
Region 
1960 1970 1980 1988 
All Shi (cities) 6,997 12,953 
(7.21) 
21,434 
(5.00) 
30,922 
(5.35) 
Six largest cities 5,230 10,052 
(8.22) 
15,596 
(4.41) 
20,075 
(3.05) 
Seoul 2,445 5,536 
(9.84) 
8,364 
(3.95) 
10,287 
(2.19) 
All Kun (Counties) 17,992 18,512 
(-1.15) 
16,002 
(-2.23) 
11,053 
(-7.59) 
Eup (townships) 2,257 2,800 
(1.48) 
4,540 
(4.05) 
3,636 
(-8.95) 
Myon (villages) 15,731 15,372 
(-2.17) 
11,463 
(-4.17) 
7,417 
(-6.89) 
Source: Economic Planning Biro, Korea Statistical Yearbook.198;. Economic Planning Biro, 
Population and Housing Census, 1960, 1966, 1970, 1980; Ministry of Home Affair, 
Municipal Yearbook of Korea, 1971, 1989.  Cited by Lindauer and others, ed. (1997: 
126). 
 
From the above analysis, it could be interpreted that in the period before 
implementation of Saemaul Undong, the migration was relatively high. That was also 
happened during Korean government conducting Saemaul Undong. That is meant that 
there was no significant contribution of Saemaul Undong in restraining migration flow 
to urban area. This interpretation does not only relying on the trend but also based on 
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the reason the reason of rural people to migrate to urban. Since the reason to move to 
urban was due to get a higher income (Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute, 
2000: 72, Lindauer, 1997: 124), it is more salient that Saemaul Undong could not 
reduce the high migration rate into urban. 
 
IV.D Saemaul Undong: Political Motive behind Its Initiation  
Saemaul Undong policy, which was initiated by Park Chung Hee in 1971 could, 
be discerned from many perspectives. Two perspectives represented by two groups of 
scholars tried to explain  Park’s motive behind the initiation of Samaul Undong. Most of 
the first group of scholars agree that Park initiate Saemaul Undong because Park 
sympathy and concern to farmer. Meanwhile the most of group of scholars argued that 
motive of Park initiated Saemaul Undong was political motive. 
Ban (1975: 4; Kim:1977: 208) argued that Park had sincere concern about living 
condition of rural people. This deep concern stimulated him to launch Saemaul Undong. 
In line with Ban, Park (1998: 3) and Whang (1981: 40-41; 1997: 154) elaborated that 
the motive Park to implement Saemaul Undong was to show his great sympathy to 
farmer. The sympathy stemmed from his economic background, as a son of farmer and 
grew up in rural area. 
On the other hand, Brandt (Ban, Moon, and Perkins, 1982: 275), Burmeister 
(1988: 70), Kihl (Hopkins, Puchala, and Talbot. ed,. 1979: 156), Lie (1998: 109), and 
Wade(1982: 18) elaborated that the initiation of Saemaul Undong was due to political 
motive. Since the wide gap of rural-urban income, political support of rural people to 
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Park Chung Hee dropped down. To maintain political support, Park Chung Hee initiated 
Saemaul Undong.  
To find out what was the motive of Park Chung Hee in launching Saemaul 
Undong, it is important to understand political-economic situation and agricultural 
policies in period of the initiation of Saemaul Undong. 
Idea to raise farmer income, actually, did not show up for the first time when 
Park launched Saemaul Undong in 1971. In a book entitled “Our Nation Path” written 
by Park in 1962, Park (1962: 220-221) elaborated that he realized there were wide 
income gap between farmer and elite politician. To raise farmer economy, economic 
policies should be focused on agricultural development. At another part of this book 
Park elaborate his idea to develop agriculture sector  
“We must develop agriculture for economic rehabilitation. It is vitally important 
to establish self-sufficiency of rural areas as a part of our national economy. We 
must encourage the export of farm products in an effort to help restore our 
international balance of payment. In this country, more than 60% of the 
populations are farmers. The ever-pressing problem of our national economic 
development is, in substance, the solution of farm problem and the rescue of 
farmer from economic and technical backwardness. Further, since farmers from 
constitute a market which plays an important role in economic progress, I 
believe the increase of farmer’ income is vital. In our effort to seek the path 
towards a better life for farmers leading to the development of the over-all 
national economy we must mention some of the important parts of our farm 
proposals (Park, 1962: 222) 
What written by Park above reveals his deep concern as well as his idea and promise to 
develop agricultural sector. He delivered his obsession in 1962, seven years before he 
launched dual price policy and nine years before initiation of Saemaul Undong. 
 Until 1969, however, Park did not realize his opinion to raise farmers’ income. That is 
meant Park passed two presidential elections in 1963 and in 1967. The analytical 
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question could be raised then is why Park did not bring his idea into reality during his 
period of taking authority. That was because if he was defeated by his opposition in 
1963 or in 1967 presidential election he loosed his opportunity to express his sympathy 
to rural people.  
During that period no one could convince Park that he would win in those 
presidential election. Park faced many political difficulties in that period. Many Korean, 
particularly the educated middle class did not fully accept Park rule (Lie,1998: 76) 
Since those difficulties Park was almost defeated by his political rival in 1963 election. 
Park was only narrowly won in the election (Cummings, 1997: 354-355; Haggard 1994, 
1994: 24). Park won simply over 1% of the votes (Lie, 1998: 54). 
In 1969, eventually, Park launched a policy to increase rural people income. 
This policy was dual price policy. Initiation of dual price policy, however, was not apart 
from political situation in the period of its initiation. Haggard (1994: 27) argued that 
Park conducted dual price policy to subsidized farmer. That was because political 
concern of Park to raise rural people loyalty. Park (1998: 33-34; Saemaul Undong 
Central Training Institute, 2000: 22) elaborated that rural urban gap was one of political 
issues in presidential election of 1967. To gain political support, in his campaign Park 
promise to subsidize farmers through implementing dual price policy. 
Through dual price policy government did not only subsidize farmer but also 
urban workers. During the last 1960s Park also faced a serious political-economic 
problem in urban area. In 1969, 30 firms went bankrupt (Cummings, 1997: 362). It 
yielded unemployment problem, which lead to high militancy to against government 
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policy. Labor demonstration was relatively high (Haggard, 1994: 25). Labor working 
class undertook strike to maintain a better working condition. Providing rice subsidy for 
urban working class, then, would reduce militancy as well as help low wage rate in 
urban area. That was meant that Park initiated dual price policy to respond his political 
difficulty either in rural or in urban area.  
Rural-urban disparity showed up again as political issue in 1971 presidential 
election. Kim Dae Jung, as Park’s opposition raised this issue in his campaign. 
According to Haggard (1994: 28) Kim emphasized that he would bring equitable 
distribution of income, undertake agricultural reform, some other issues related to 
farmers’ economy. Kim also raised regional disparity dilemma. Kim stated that the 
economic growth was more beneficial to Kyongsang province rather than another 
provinces, particularly Cholla province. The explanation of this phenomenon was 
because Kyongsang province was the province where Park grew up. As a result of 
Kim’s campaign Park suffered a declined rural political support. Kim defeated Park in 
the south western region (Hopkins, Puchala, and Talbot, ed., 1979: 156). 
Taking account of the deteriorating trend of rural support, particularly in rural 
area, Park launched Saemaul Undong. From this fact it is clear that the instituting of 
Saemaul Undong was not because Park express his sympathy as well as his concern to 
rural economy. It was a political movement to maintain rural loyalty to support Park. 
Moreover as elaborated at theoretical framework that power holder may decide a certain 
policy to serve electoral interest. In other words, 1971 presidential election motivated 
Park to decide Saemaul Undong as a policy to serve his constituents.  
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However the analysis should not be ended up here. It is interesting to scrutinize 
the reason of Park to claim that the enhancement of income was due to Saemaul 
Undong not because of dual price policy. In inauguration speech on December 27, 1972, 
Park stated: 
“Armed with the spirit of diligence, self-help, and cooperation, the Saemaul 
Undong is steadily narrowing the gap between urban and rural communities” 
(The Samhwa Publishing, Co.:137). 
From his speech above, the interesting phenomenon is not only the substance of his 
claim was not based the real fact but also the period when he claim. He claimed in 1972, 
in the period of Saemaul Undong conducting the first step that focused on building 
physical infrastructure. Saemaul Undong has not implemented its stage that emphasized 
on income enhancement. That is meant that the performance of increasing farmers’ 
income in 1972 was belonging to dual price policy.  
Park’s propaganda about Saemaul Undong did not only deny the efficacy of dual 
price policy but also green revolution. He did not include dual price policy as well as 
green revolution as factors that increased agricultural output as well as farmers’ income. 
According to Ban, Moon, and Perkins (1982: 45-46) the upgrading of agricultural 
output in 1970s was due to adoption of high yield varieties, such as tongil and high 
increased utilization of fertilizer and pesticide, and improvement of irrigation. From 
four determinants mentioned above, Saemaul Undong component was simply irrigation 
facility. The other component; high yielding variety of paddy, fertilizer, and pesticide 
were parts of green revolution components.  
Therefore it is seem that Park tried to hide dual price policy and green revolution 
from its existence. Instead of stating that the enhancement of agricultural product as 
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well as upgrading of rural income were due to green revolution and dual price policy 
Park stated that it was due to Saemaul Undong efficacy. It is meant that Park Chung 
Hee wanted to cap up dual price policy as well as green revolution by Saemaul Undong. 
Burmaeister (1988: 66) argued that Park Chung Hee launched Saemaul 
Undongto cap up dual price policy. According to Burmeister, Park covered dual price 
policy with Saemaul Undong because dual price policy was a policy to facilitate tongil 
production drive.  
In this research, the researcher prefers to argue that the reason of park to cover 
dual price policy with Saemaul Undong was because dual price policy caused a huge 
financial deficit. It was not a good political image to implement a policy with high risk 
of financial management. At the same time he covered green revolution because green 
revolution raised inequality between large and small farmers, increased landlessness, 
and impoverishment of rural society (Szirmai 1997: 267-268). The Korean green 
revolution particularly in the distribution of fertilizer, was more beneficial to the 
investor of fertilizer companies rather than to farmers (Lee and Kim, 1991: 385-386). 
So far, this research found two motives of Park to initiate Saemaul Undong. The 
third finding of Park reason to launch Saemaul Undong is more important than the two 
motives elaborated above. The third motive is park wanted to build “One Saemaul 
Nation”. Concept of one Saemaul nation refers Park’s effort to control over his nation. 
This control was conducted through gaining compliance from his populist in one 
mechanism of control. 
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In his message to the conference of provincial government, July 30, 1971, Park 
delivered his speech: 
“I also wish to emphasize that that the real hero of rural community is the man 
who devotes his sweat and blood, without words, to the task of developing his 
home town or village. Our society is in need of many such community heroes. 
National construction or development cannot be achieved by those who make 
fine speeches but do not fit actions to their words” (Message to the conference 
of provincial governors, July 30, 1971,. Cited by Whang 1982: 46). 
 
Park’s speech reveals he request to his people to work hard without making any protests. 
If someone worked hard without any protest was a hero. On the other hand if some one 
protest he was not a hero. It could be interpreted, at least into two interpretations. This 
request was relevant to the political situation he faced. In the same period Park 
delivered his speech, Park faced many anti government protests (Haggard, 1994: 25) 
rate of labor demonstration was relatively high. In 1971 there was 1,656 labor disputes 
(Cumming, 1997: 363). Second interpretation is Park wanted to cultivate his ideology to 
rural people to get their compliance. Hero in this sense is hero from Park’s perspective. 
However it was not a hero in the perspective of someone who demonstrated. As a hero 
he/she would comply with the one who give the position of hero. 
 In the same period, at another occasion Park stated 
“You (city mayors and county chiefs) must uphold the Saemaul spirit as the 
basic guideline of national development, and do your best for its universal 
dissemination. You must in particular seek our young and ambitious workers, 
and train them as potential leaders in the rural development program.” (Message 
to Comparative Administration Conference of City Mayors and County Chiefs, 
September 17, 1971. Cited by Whang 1982: 46). 
 
 
One interesting concept stated by Park was “basic guideline of national 
development”. Term of basic guideline of national development is a term refers to 
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fundamental guidance or procedure in a process of development throughout the country. 
If Park stated that Saemaul Undong was a basic guideline of national development, 
which could be interpreted that Park took Saemaul Spirit as the fundamental guidance to 
develop Korea. This term also reveals park’s efforts to uniformize model of 
development. In this concept, there was no locality variation. One guideline procedure 
as a model is implemented in every region throughout Korea. This means that park 
attempt to reduce conflict and gained obedience from his nation. 
The second interesting part of the above speech is that park requested mayor and 
county chief to select ambitious-potential  leader to be trained. Since the individual 
promotion, as elaborated at introduction part, depended on the extent of his/her 
achievement of Saemaul Undong goals (Ban, Moon, and Perkins, 1982: 276), mayor as 
well as county chief would search the potential leader to be trained as Park’s “hero”. It 
reveals that the appointment of rural development “hero” was conducted through top 
down mechanism. 
The third interesting point is that training is the mechanism to produce the 
“hero”. Since this training was single perspective training, it was possible that the 
training was Park’s instrument to internalize the Saemaul spirit. Through producing 
hero by training, it would be easier for Park to govern Saemaul Undong. 
In expanding Saemaul spirit, Park did not only cultivate Saemaul spirit in rural 
area but also disseminate in another spheres. As explained in previous part, after 
initiated rural Saemaul Undong, Park launched labor, school, and church Saemaul 
Undong.  Since Saemaul Undong was a policy to increase income as he stated below, 
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“The easiest way of explaining it (Saemaul Undong) is to say that Saemaul 
Undong is a movement for a better life…..What then is living better? Eating 
well, wearing fine clothes and residing a good house….To realize this better life, 
the first thing we have to do is to drive out poverty and do away with 
paucity……What should we do to exterminate poverty? We should work hard 
to increase income so that the income of our family and our village can 
increase” (On may 18, 1972, at a mass rally to encourage farmers and fishermen 
to increase income through the Saemaul Undong, cited by The Samhwa 
Publishing, Co.,: 102-103) 
 
It was not by chance Park expanded Saemaul Undong on those three fields. It was 
reasonable to cultivate Saemaul Undong ideology into labor to increase worker income. 
However it is difficult to find out the explanation if Park expanded Saemaul Undong 
into education as well as religion spheres. Therefore, it must be any motive behind this 
expansion. Park undertook it with plausible reason.  
 The reason was that those labor, school, and church were the sectors, which the 
most vocal in their voice to demand democracy and better working condition. Labor, as 
elaborated before, was actor who militantly demonstrated to maintain the higher wage. 
In the same period student also demonstrated. Similar to labor, student was considered 
as steady opposition to Park (Lie, 1998: 77). Labor protests as well as student 
demonstration were quelled by army troop (see Cummings, 1997: 357-358) but it did 
not happen to church. Like student and labor, Christian was also against Park rule. 
However church was untouchable by Park’s military power.  
“Korean churches were primary sanctuaries of resistance to Park dictatorship, 
mainly because even KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency) worried about 
knocking down the doors of churches with tanks (banging through university 
gates did not bother the KCIA)” (Cummings, 1997: 371). 
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Therefore to reduce their militancy and eventually gained their compliance Park 
cultivated peace and harmonious ideology into those three vocal fields. The end of these 
efforts were to gain compliance. 
 One of park speech, which raised a topic, related to relationship between 
employee and employer expresses the above interpretation.  
 “The Saemaul Movement as practiced in offices and factories is nothing 
different…for its basic spirit remains the same: diligence, self help and 
teamwork …. There should be close labor-management cooperation, with the 
company president making an utmost effort to improve pay and welfare, and the 
later fulfilling their duties with a sense of responsibility and sincerity, doing 
factory work like their own personal work …Thereby complete harmony 
between employees and employers would be made possible…(Cummings,1997: 
313) 
The above speech implies that park tried to internalize a harmonious relationship 
between employee and employer. In industrial relations spheres term of harmony refers 
to relationship could be interpreted that Park undertook effort to abolish conflict 
between labor-management. That was because conflict labor-management would 
threaten his political position through any labor demonstrations. In democratic regime,  
conflict between one element of society and another would not be viewed as a threat of 
the democracy (Lipset, 1981: 70-71)  
To drive out the conflict from surface, one of the methods to do is by achieving 
national consensus. If every element has the same perspective, opinion, or ideology, 
there would less possibility of emerging the conflict. As presented below, Park 
employed Saemaul Undong as an impetus to attain national consensus. 
“The Saemaul Undong will provide impetus to achieve a consistent national 
consensus, which is required for the modernization of our fatherland. It is the 
embodiment of a great stride ahead for the spirit of May 16th Revolution and for 
the solidification of our sense of nation identity.” (An address delivered at the 
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National Awards Presentation ceremony on the occasion of the 11th anniversary 
of  the May 16, 19961 Military Revolution, cited by The Samhwa Publishing, 
Co.:176) 
 
 
Many studies elaborated that Park expanded Saemaul Undong in labor, school, 
and church, but in fact park was also cultivate Saemaul spirit into army as well. 
 
“Our persistent effort based on the principles of self-reliance and self-help will 
enable our Armed Force to posses truly independent capabilities. I hereby 
simply and clearly define as “the Saemaul Undong of the Armed Forces” the 
practical goal for strengthening our self-reliant national defense posture, and I 
strongly exhort all members of our Armed Forces to launch this movement 
aggressively.” (An address delivered on the 25th Armed Forces day on October 1, 
1973, cited by The Samhwa Publishing, Co.:145) 
 
 
Park did not only expand Saemaul Undong  into army sphere but also into sport 
field. In an address delivered on the opening the 54th National Athletic Games, October 
12, 1973 Park stated: 
“At this gala festival of the nation, vigorous and stout youth from throughout the 
country are to exert them selves to demonstrate fully their talents and strength 
and spirit of unity, for the acquisition of  which they have so painstakingly toilet 
and trained….. The  saemaul spirit of collaboration and unity, however shone 
brilliantly here……This is solely the result of unwavering efforts and close 
cooperation and unity so beautifully……. This certainly can be cited as a most 
exemplary case of success in which the Saemaul spirit of self-help and 
cooperation has bloomed into proud triumph.” (An address delivered on the 
opening the 54th National Athletic Games, October 12, 1973. cited by The 
Samhwa Publishing, Co.:150-151) 
 
Those efforts imply that park tried to disseminate Saemaul Undong spirit into any field 
he felt possible.   
Even he also attempted to expand Saemaul Undong in Asia Pacific region. In an 
address delivered before ASPAC meeting he spoke: 
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“Today, Korean throughout the nation are participating, with much devotion and 
enthusiasm in we call Saemaul Undong. This movement has been motivated by 
spirit of industry, self-help and cooperation. As I said earlier, this spirit 
corresponds with the basic spirit ASPAC. This campaign represents an approach 
and endeavor on our part to modernize the country and eventually to further our 
contributions to the realization of peace and prosperity in the Asian and pacific 
region….through undertaking such as the Saemaul Undong, will continue to try 
every path, and seek every avenue, toward peace and progress in the region and 
eventually throughout the world.” (An address delivered before ASPAC 
Meeting on June 14, 1972. cited by The Samhwa Publishing, Co.,: 76) 
 
Those all reveal that Park tried to disseminate Saemaul Undong ideology to any 
field and area he though possible. Through cultivating Saemaul Undong spirit as wide 
as possible, it would be easier for Park to get compliance throughout his nation. 
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                            IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 
IV.A. Conclusion  
The entire analysis above leads to conclusion that Saemaul Undong did not 
increase rural community income. The result of analysis shows that without Saemaul 
Undong farmer income increased after the initiation of dual price policy. Therefore the 
variable that raised rural people income was dual price policy. In addition, Saemaul 
Undong was not enable Korea to achieve rice self-sufficiency as well as could not 
restrain migration flow from rural to urban area. The last point of conclusion is that 
Park Chung had political motive behind the initiation of Saemaul Undong. 
The main different features between Saemaul Undong and dual price policy was 
that Saemaul Undong involved a certain magnitude of expenditure meanwhile dual 
price policy did not. The significance of agricultural expenditure in deteriorating 
agricultural terms of trade occurred because Pak Chung Hee implemented Saemaul 
Undong together with green revolution. This conclusion is based on the fact that during 
implementation of Saemaul Undong, the utility of three agricultural inputs: high yield 
variety, pesticide, and chemical fertilizer were relatively high. It seemed that that Park 
mixed between Saemaul Undong and green revolution. The reason was: since many 
technical-agricultural problems, it was difficult for Park to increase rice production 
without involving green revolution. Unfortunately, green revolution demands farmers to 
utilize those three agricultural inputs. Farmers had to purchase them in urban area.  It 
deteriorated terms of trade. Moreover it happened in the same period of first and second 
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oil shock. One of the aftermath of oil shock was the degree of deteriorating term of 
trade worse off because oil shock raised the price of industrial product such as fertilizer. 
 Instead of bearing a certain cost to farmer, dual price policy providing subsidy to 
farmer. Since the subsidy was distributed through purchasing rice, it increased 
agricultural terms of trade. Term of trade increased significantly in 1969. That period 
was the period when Korean government increased its subsidy to farmer more than 
300%. The enhancement of terms of trade went unwaveringly until 1973. However, 
when Saemaul Undong focused its project to increased agricultural production in 1974-
1976, it deteriorated terms of trade. This suggested that determinant increasing rural 
income was dual price policy. 
The above fact reveals that Saemaul Undong as strategy of rural community 
development did not treat rural and urban as one economic system. This system is 
important to convince that any changes on an entity of the system could be followed by 
adjusment the system so between one element and another always in a balance 
relationship. Case of price management was the case shown that Saemaul Undong did 
not treat rural-urban as one economic system. 
The fact that Korea achieved rice self sufficiency after Saemaul Undong was not 
implemented anymore but still in the period of implementing dual price policy reveals 
that Saemaul Undong could not help Korea to attain rice self-sufficiency. That is meant 
that dual price was the variable of attaining rice self-sufficiency. The other unsuccessful 
implementation of Saemaul Undong was Saemaul Undong could not restrain migration 
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flow to urban area. The indicator was that there was no significant change of migration 
trend before and after Korean government conducted Saemaul Undong.  
Even though Saemaul Undong was implemented unsuccessfully, Park claimed 
Saemaul Undong increased rural income. There are at least two explanations. First 
explanation relies on Park’s main indicator of attaining Saemaul Undong’s goal. The 
success of conducting Saemaul Undong projects was measured by the amount of 
physical achievement. Saemaul Undong’s physical outcomes showed that Park 
emphasized on quick result and flashy show. It seems that park wanted to create image 
of modernity and success (Jacob, 1985: 109).  
Concept of physical achievement covered concept of beautification. It seem that 
park was obsessed to beautify his country. The indicator was that Park invested the 
budget for the first stage of Saemaul Undong almost 100% for beautifying Korea.  
This obsession is the main idea of second explanation. Park not only did want to 
beautify Korea physical sphere but also in political sphere. Park wanted to beautify 
political image of dual price policy as well as green revolution. Park has never stated 
that dual price policy increased rural income. Also, park did not say that agricultural out 
put grew up due to green revolution. Instead of stating that dual price policy raised farm 
income and green revolution upgraded agricultural product, Park claimed those were 
because of Saemaul Undong efficacy. That was because dual price policy as well as 
green revolution was not “beautiful”. The reasons were that dual price policy 
engendered financial deficit for Korean government. At the same time green revolution 
resulted new inequality in rural level: inequality between large farmer and small farmer. 
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The other ”unbeautiful” of green revolution: green revolution was more beneficial the 
one who invested in distribution of high yield varieties, pesticide, and chemical 
fertilizer.  
The second explanation above is one of political motive of Pak initiated 
Saemaul Undong. The second political motives were: Park launched Saemaul Undong 
to maintain political support. Political situation faced by park suggested to Park to 
decide a policy to serve rural people so that rural people contributed their vote to 
legitimate Park took authority. Gaining legitimacy through election is the key point to 
get compliance from subordinate. That is because subordinate simply obey voluntarily 
to legitimated ruling power. 
The last political motive was: Park wanted to establish “one Saemaul 
nation”.Concept of “one Saemaul nation” basically is not different from concept of “one 
farm” stated by Wade (1982: 5). Concept “one Saemaul nation” refers to an ideology 
built by Park through cultivate Saemaul spirit into every field as well as region Pak felt 
possible to cultivate. The main objective was is to get compliance throughout his nation. 
Many studies elaborated that Park disseminate Saemaul Undong spirit into 
industrial, education, and religion spheres through initiating factory Saemaul Undong, 
school Saemaul Undong, as well as church Saemaul Undong. However, in fact Park 
expanded Saemaul Undong more than those three sectors. Park also disseminated 
Saemaul Undong into sport as well as military spheres. The reason of Park cultivated 
Saemaul Undong into factory, school, and church because Park want to get obedience 
from workers, students, and Christian. During his period of taking authority, students, 
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workers, as well as Christians were the most militant element of Korean society who 
demonstrated against Park rule. Through cultivating Saemaul Undong ideology, which 
taught cooperation, peace, and harmony, Park expected that they would obey 
voluntarily to his rule. 
Park did not end up his efforts to disseminate Saemaul Undong ideology into 
Korea. He also tried to cultivate Saemaul ideology into Asia Pacipic region. This is 
meant that Park undertook his effort in any fields as well as regions he thought possible. 
Therefore it is not exaggeration to conclude that Park created “one Saemaul nation” to 
disseminate Saemaul Undong ideology throughout his country to get compliance from 
his nation. 
Park efforts in disseminating Saemaul Undong into Asia Pacific brought 
Saemaul Undong as international phenomenon. Nowadays, this phenomenon is kept by 
regimes after Park took authority. Korean government disseminates Saemaul Undong 
ideology by providing scholarship to train to public policy decision makers from around 
the world. The institution that trains them is the same institution, which was employed 
by Park to train Saemaul Undong leaders. This phenomenon reveals that Korean 
regimes go hand in hand to disseminate Saemaul Undong around the world. It goes 
beyond the differences of regimes’ political interest. They do it not for their regime. 
They do it for their nation interest. They do it for Saemaul Undong. 
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IV.B. Recommendation. 
Implementation of Saemaul Undong was a manifestation of government 
intervention to manage local resources in rural area. Concept of managing local 
resources is how to use local human resources, natural resources, and economical 
resources so that those resources make local people. One point should be highlighted is 
that government should not intervene in unlimited period. If local people already can 
manage by themselves, government should end up its intervention. In this case, 
mechanism to prepare local people so that they could manage rural community 
development after government dos not intervene anymore is important. 
Saemaul Undong measured it success on physical achievement. Based on the 
above argument, it did not prepare local people to be subject of development. Therefore, 
it would be better for Korean government to employ its success indicators on how to 
make local people self-reliant. If local people are self-reliant, they would able to make 
decision by themselves and social-economically would not depend up on another entity. 
This is important to make sure that after intervention is ended up, local people are able 
to manage local resources by them selves. 
The main idea is how to engender sustainability in the process of rural 
community development. Local people would be able to assess and formulate their need, 
understand what they have, eventually know how to fulfill their need by managing their 
belonging. The preparation could be undertaken through a mechanism that enable local 
people to make decision, assess and formulate their need, identify their resources, and 
how to manage their resources so that next generation has the same opportunity to use 
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the resources as that of current generation. The researcher believes that if the 
empowerment above goes well, rural income generation would emerge automatically.    
The income generation, however, would be meaningless for rural people if it 
does not increase their purchasing power. Suppose that rural income increase. At the 
same time price of urban product also increase. That is meant that price received by 
rural people does not enhance rural people capability to purchase urban good as well as 
urban service. In this respect, role of government to make sure that rural income 
enhancement would followed by upgrading purchasing power is important. Since 
Saemaul Undong did not involve mechanism of purchasing power enhancement, it is 
necessary for Korean government to enhance rural people purchasing power.   
It could be undertaken by managing price of rural-urban products so that change 
of in any one of those products would not deteriorate agricultural terms of trade. The 
basic consideration is that rural development should enable price received farmer is not 
lower than price paid by farmer. In this case government should pay attention on how to 
manage agricultural output. The high supply of food to urban area, for instance, would 
deteriorate terms of trade. That is meant that Korean government should treat rural-
urban as one economic system. This system would guarantee that any changes on price 
in one region would be followed by any adjustment on the other area. 
The last recommendation is about willingness of Korean government to open 
new discourse on Saemaul Undong. Based on the conclusion of this research, claims 
and propagandas of Park Chung Hee were not true. Unfortunately, nowadays Korean 
government disseminates Park’s propaganda through providing scholarship for public 
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policy decision maker from around the world to take training on Saemaul Undong. 
Hence, to a certain extent Park propaganda is true public discourse.  
Taking account of this circumstance, Korean government should facilitate so 
that every element of society has a good access to understand the true story of Saemaul 
Undong. It could be undertaken through changing the system of training on Saemaul 
Undong. The training should not only from government perspective but also from 
perspective of non-governmental organization as well as other civilian organizations. 
The other agenda is, Korean government should facilitate any researches on Saemaul 
Undong and academic activities related to Saemaul Undong. 
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